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THE FLAWED ECONOMICS OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
PAUL E. MCGREAL"
Shhh! If you keep very, very quiet, and listen really, really
carefully, you just might hear it rustling around underneath the
Constitution. Like the sound of a tree falling in a deserted for-
est, constitutional law commentators are never sure if it truly
exists. And, like people who claim to have seen UFOs, state gov-
ernments swear that it exists and is here to conquer them. What
is this lurking presence that so perplexes the mind? It is the
doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause, perhaps the Supreme
Court's best known invocation of constitutional silence.' And, to
continue mxang metaphors, that unseen constitutional doctrine
acts like a colorless, odorless toxic gas: a silent killer of state
laws affecting interstate commerce.
Exactly what is this hideous thing? In short, the dormant
Commerce Clause is a constitutional law doctrine that says
Congress's power to "regulate Commerce among the several
States"2 implicitly restricts state power over the same area.' In
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School; J.D. SMU Law School. I would like to thank Bruce Burton, Linda Eads,
Kara Kellogg, Ricardo Lopez, Tom Mayo, James Musselman, Fran Ortiz, Val Ricks,
and Kevin Yamamoto for their helpful comments on prior drafts of this Article, as
well as Dax Faubus and John White for their research assistance. I also received
comments on a presentation of this Article at the April 1997 Works-rn-Progress ses-
sion at South Texas College of Law. Work on this Article was supported by a
summer research grant from South Texas College of Law.
1. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (stating that
the dormant Commerce Clause derives from the "great silences of the Constitution").
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590,
1596 (1997) ("[Tlhe Commerce Clause not only granted Congress express author-
ity to override restrictive and conflicting commercial regulations adopted by the
States, but it also immediately effected a curtailment of state power."); Wy-
omng v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977); Baldwin v. G.AF. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 522 (1935); ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLI-
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general, the Commerce Clause places two main restrictions on
state power. First, Congress can preempt state law merely by
exercising its Commerce Clause power.4 Second, the Commerce
Clause itself-absent action by Congress-restricts state power;
the grant of federal power implies a corresponding restriction of
state power.5 This second limitation has come to be known as
the "dormant" Commerce Clause because it restricts state power
even though Congress's commerce power lies dormant.6
Generally, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits
states from unduly interfering with interstate commerce.7 The
Court has developed two tests to determine when state regulation
has gone too far. Under one test, the Court balances the burden
on interstate commerce against the state's interest in its regula-
CIES § 5.3, at 306-07 (1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
6-2, at 403 (2d ed. 1988).
4. This is done through the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, clause 2 of the
Constitution: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S.
CONST., art. VI. Congress need not expressly state that it is preempting state law;
courts may infer that Congress has preempted state law when state law conflicts with
or impedes the functioning of federal law. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (noting that courts will find that federal law pre-
empts an entire subject when "the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently compre-
hensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementa-
ry state regulation") (citation omitted); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(stating that state law is preempted when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"); Henry H.
Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth Centu-
ry Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 532
(1993); Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Pre-emption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 830-41 (1995).
5. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-2, at 403 ("All of the doctrine in this area
is . . . traceable to the Constitution's negative implications . . ").
6. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829)
(noting that state power over interstate commerce is restricted by Congress's "power
to regulate commerce in its dormant state"). As one commentator has pointed out,
the label "dormant Commerce Clause" is a misnomer because the doctrine applies
when Congress is dormant, not the Clause itself. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982). Regardless,
this paper adopts the usage shared by most courts and commentators.
7. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 5.3.1, at 306 ("The dormant commerce
clause is the principle that the state and local laws are unconstitutional if they
place an undue burden on interstate commerce."); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-2, at 403;
Eule, supra note 6, at 426.
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tion.s Under the second test, states are prohibited generally from
enacting laws that discriminate against interstate commerce. 9
Over the last two decades, the dormant Commerce Clause has
received much scholarly attention, with commentators either
proposing refinements to the balancing test0 or challenging the
constitutional basis for the doctrine as a whole." The commenta-
tors, however, generally have been kind to the antidiscrimination
test of the dormant Commerce Clause.' Indeed, even Justice
8. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981);
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1978); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, ... it will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-71 (1945).
9. See infra Part I.B.1; see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978) (deciding that New Jersey's law "block[ing] the importation of waste"
from outside the state was impermissible under the Commerce Clause).
10. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 43 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395 (1986); James M. O'Fallon, The Commerce
Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REv. 395 (1982); Robert A. Sedler, The
Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An
Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985); Mark
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125; see also
Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1203 (1986) (describing doctrines of the law concerning state interference with
interstate commerce).
11. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 234 (1985); Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Fed-
eralism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV.
71, 78-80 (1980); Eule, supra note 6, at 446-47 (suggesting the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV, section 2 as a more appropriate control on commercial
isolationism); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, the American Common Market and Public
Choice, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 122-23 (1982); David Pomper, Recyclizig Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial 'Natural" Re-
sources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1316-17 (1989); Martin
H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 573 (stating that "not only is there no
textual basis... , but.., the dormant commerce clause actually contradicts, and
therefore directly undermines, the Constitution's carefully established textual structure
for allocating power between federal and state sovereigns"). Just last term, three Jus-
tices reached just that conclusion. In a dissent joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded: "The nega-
tive Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense,
and has proved virtually unworkable in application." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.
v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1615 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 10, at 73-85; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
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Antonin Scalia, who has argued vigorously (in dissent) that the
Court should abandon the dormant Commerce Clause,"3 applies
the antidiscrimination principle.' 4
Swimming against this tide, this Article argues that the
Court's application of the antidiscrimination test is, in some cas-
es, in conflict with the underlying purpose of the Commerce
Clause: to protect the national economic market from opportu-
nistic behavior by the states. 5 The Court has never held that
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state commerce, with-
out more, violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Rather, the
Court has explained that the dormant Commerce Clause is con-
cerned with state laws that both: (1) discriminate between in-
state and out-of-state actors that compete with one another, and
(2) harm the welfare of the national economy. 6 Thus, a dis-
criminatory state law that harms the national economy is per-
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MIcH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 895-
98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash-
ington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
14. Justice Scalia applies the antidiscrimination test, but nevertheless refuses to
apply the balancing test of the dormant Commerce Clause, except in rare cases and
then only on stare decisis grounds. See Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897 ("Is-
sues already decided I would leave untouched .... ") (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
In my view, a state statute is invalid under the Commerce Clause if, and
only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a
respect not required to achieve a lawful purpose. When such a validating
purpose exists, it is for Congress and not us to determine it is not signif-
icant enough to justify the burden on commerce.
Id. at 898 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
15. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988) ("This
'negative' aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism-that is,
regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-
of-state competitors."); Collins, supra note 10, at 46 (noting that the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine tries to "identify protectionist actions by state governments
that are hostile to other states."); infra Part I.B.1.
16. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 11, at 76 ("The Court historically has
sought to ensure that, when a state intervenes in the marketplace composed of indi-
viduals and their business associations, it does so without unduly subverting eco-
nomic efficiency, viewed on a national scale."); Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Mar-
ket-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395,
398-400 (1989); infra Part I.B.1.
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missible if in-state and out-of-state commerce do not compete."
Conversely, a state law that discriminates between in-state and
out-of-state competitors is permissible if it does not harm the
national economy."8
The Court has been careless in applying the
antidiscrimination test; in many cases, neither of the two re-
quirements-interstate competition or harm to the national
economy-is ever mentioned. 9 As the Court stated just last
term, these requirements have "more often than not... re-
mained dormant in this Court's opinions on state discrimination
subject to review under the dormant Commerce Clause."" The
reason the first requirement, competition between in-state and
out-of-state actors, goes unstated is fairly obvious-in most cases
(all except two before the Supreme Court), it is clear that in-
state and out-of-state actors compete in the same market.2' The
Court's silence merely reflects the (in)frequency with which the
issue arises.
The reason the second requirement, harm to the national
economy, goes unstated is more complex. The main task of this
Article is to show that the Court has neglected this requirement
not because it is rarely an issue, but rather because the Court
has incorrectly assumed the issue away. Specifically, the Court
assumes that discrimination between in-state and out-of-state
competitors necessarily harms the welfare of the national econo-
17. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824-26 (1997) (finding
that because in-state and out-of-state natural gas suppliers did not compete, a dis-
criminatory state tax did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause); Alaska v. Arc-
tic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961) (finding that in-state and out-of-state salmon
processors did not compete and thus discriminatory state tax did not violate the dor-
mant Commerce Clause). These cases are discussed infra Part I.B.2.
18. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
19. See generallyHughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (explaining that an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the transportation of Oklahoma minnows outside of
Oklahoma blocks interstate commerce).
20. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 824.
21. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 272 (1988); Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986); Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1984); Lewis
v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 324; City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1978); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 367 (1976); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
526 (1949); Baldwin v. GJ.AF. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1935).
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my, making the second requirement superfluous." In making
this assumption, the Court implicitly has adopted a neoclassical
view of economics-that free competition among rational eco-
nomic actors will necessarily improve the national economy.'
Thus, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis assumes
that neoclassical economics best describes the position of states
regulating interstate commerce.
Game theory offers an alternate view of economics and alter-
nate set of economic assumptions that may better model the po-
sition of states regulating interstate commerce. As a close cousin
of economics, game theory assumes that individuals act rational-
ly; to economists, this means people try to maximize their per-
sonal welfare.' Using this assumption, game theory models
strategic behavior-situations where "two or more individuals
interact and each individual's decision turns on what that indi-
vidual expects the others to do."25 Game theory tries to predict
how rational people will behave in strategic behavior situa-
tions.26 Conversely, neoclassical economics assumes that ratio-
nal people decide how to act based on prevailing market condi-
22. See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
23. See Kristen H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
'Race" and Is It "To the Bottom?", 48 HAST. L.J. 271, 300 (1997) ("Neoclassical eco-
nomics assumed that the individual had no impact upon the results of the market
and that the rational pursuit of the individual's self-interest would result in society
being better off.").
24. See DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 26 n.8
(1990); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d
ed. 1989) (noting that economics assumes that rational individuals seek to "maximize
their benefits less their costs"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3
(5th ed. 1998) ("The task of economics ... is to explore the implications of assum-
ing that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions . . . ."); cf.
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavorial Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997) (dis-
cussing empirical research that suggests people do not always act rationally in an
economic sense).
25. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994); see also
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 9
(2d ed. 1994) ("Game theory is concerned with the actions of decision makers who
are conscious that their actions affect each other."); MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECO-
NOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 85 (1996) (explaining that people "act
strategically" when they "act to maximize their wealth given what they expect the
other party to do").
26. See KEPS, supra note 24, at 5 ("The point of game theory is to help econo-
mists understand and predict what will happen in economic contexts.").
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tions such as price, supply, and demand, independent of expecta-
tions about how others will act.
Two examples from the commercial context illustrate the dif-
ference between neoclassical economics and game theory.28
First, consider the situation of a consumer who goes to the gro-
cery store to buy a loaf of bread. Presumably, the consumer will
evaluate the information readily available in the marketplace;
she will compare the prices of the different brands along with
her perception of the quality of the different brands. Based on
this analysis, the consumer will decide which brand to purchase.
Price and quality are impersonal forces set by the market, inde-
pendent of any expectations about others' future behavior.29 In
this first example, the consumer does not act strategically-her
decision is independent of any future behavior of the grocery
store or the bread supplier.
Second, consider the purchasing agent for the grocery store
who places orders with suppliers to stock the grocery store's
shelves. In addition to price and quality, the purchasing agent
will consider the future behavior of the supplier. For example,
the purchasing agent will want to know whether the supplier is
likely to breach a contract to supply the grocery store; such a
27. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 85 ("Traditionally, price theory posits ra-
tional economic actors who pursue the maximization of wealth straightforwardly in
situations for which the opportunities available to one individual are considered inde-
pendent of the choices of other individuals."); Engel, supra note 23, at 300.
28. This example is borrowed in part from SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 85.
Another commentator illustrates the point with the following example:
When the only two publishers in a city choose prices for their newspa-
pers, aware that their sales are determined jointly, they are players in a
game with each other. They are not in a game with the readers who buy
their newspapers, because each reader ignores his effect on the publisher.
Game theory is not useful when decisions are made that ignore the reac-
tions of others or treat them as impersonal market forces.
RAsMUSEN, supra note 25, at 9.
29. Under neoclassical economic theory, the price of a good is set by: (1) aggre-
gating the individual preferences of consumers to determine how much consumers
will demand at different prices and (2) aggregating individual production profiles of
producers to determine how much will be supplied at different prices. Price will set-
tle at an equilibrium where consumer demand and producer supply are equal. See
POSNER, supra note 24, at 3-10; SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 5-48; E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 9-25 (2d ed. 1994).
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breach would result in empty shelves and lost sales. If the pur-
chasing agent expects a supplier to breach, then she may refuse
to deal with the supplier regardless of price or quality." The
purchasing agent will act strategically by considering how she
expects the other party, the supplier, to act.3
Neoclassical economics has a blind spot for strategic behavior;
the theory does not address cases in which people anticipate one
another's future actions. 2 Game theory tries to bridge this gap
by using models-known as "games'"-to predict strategic behav-
ior. These games reveal that strategic behavior may lead the
rational, freely competing actors of neoclassical economics to
nonetheless act inefficiently."3 Neoclassical economics assumes
that free competition among rational actors will be efficient;
game theory shows that the existence of strategic behavior un-
dermines that assumption.
Game theory can be used to predict strategic behavior in re-
sponse to legal rules. 4 In doing so, lawmakers can assess the
economic wisdom of different legal rules. To illustrate this point,
consider the situation of a pedestrian and a motorist approach-
ing an intersection that has four stop signs." Both the pedestri-
an and the motorist will act strategically: Each will want to
know how the other will, or is likely to, act at the intersection
before deciding how to act. If the pedestrian knows that the mo-
torist is likely to run the stop sign, then the pedestrian will al-
30. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 85.
31, Of course, consumer transactions can have an element of strategic behavior.
Consider the decision to buy a personal computer for one's home. When deciding
where or from whom to make her purchase, the consumer will consider the level of
technical support the vendor is likely to provide. After all, a computer is just an ex-
pensive paper weight if you cannot operate it. In addition to price and quality, the
consumer may also consider the vendor's likely future behavior regarding technical
support; this is strategic behavior.
32. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 85; infra notes 233-44 and accompanying
text.
33. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1315-17
(1990); Frank X. Taney, Comment, Rewriting the Law of Resale Price Maintenance:
The Kodak Decision and Transaction Cost Economics, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 321, 346-
47 (1994) ("Game theory highlights the fact that market participants do not always
exhibit completely rational, utility-maximizing behavior, as predicted by neoclassical
economists.").
34. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 1.
35. See id. at 6-31 (explaining this example further).
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low the motorist to pass before crossing the street. The
pedestrian's prediction about the motorist's likely behavior, in
turn, will be affected by the legal rules that govern the situa-
tion. For example, if the prevailing legal rules make motorists
strictly liable for all injuries to pedestrians, then the pedestrian
may predict that the motorist will exercise care, by stopping at
all stop signs, to avoid the cost of an accident.3" The
pedestrian's decision therefore will depend on her prediction
about the conduct of another person, the motorist, and the pre-
diction is influenced by the prevailing legal rules. Game theory
allows us to model such behavior as well as how legal rules
affect that behavior.
This Article uses game theory to test the neoclassical econom-
ic assumption implicit in the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination test-that discrimination between in-state
and out-of-state competitors necessarily harms the welfare of the
national market. If, in some cases, states act strategically-that
is, if states act in response to the anticipated behavior of other
states-then the Court is wrong to build neoclassical economic
assumptions into its dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination test. In these cases, state discrimination be-
tween in-state and out-of-state competitors may improve nation-
al welfare. The main task of this Article is to determine wheth-
er, in some cases, states act strategically; if so, game theory bet-
ter describes their behavior in those cases.
This Article uses one of the most active areas of dormant
Commerce Clause litigation-state regulation of solid waste dis-
posal-to illustrate that states do act strategically in some situa-
tions. As the Court and many commentators have repeated, the
nation faces a waste disposal problem, for both hazardous and
solid waste,37 and states are struggling to deal with the prob-
36. Carrying the strategic behavior further, if a strict liability rule makes pe-
destrians less careful, then motorists might respond by taking even more care to
avoid careless pedestrians.
37. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,
110 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 368-69 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-
Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L.
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lem. Many states have tried to address the waste problem with-
in their borders, leaving other states to deal with their own
waste problem."5 Such states have done so by passing laws that
discriminate between in-state and out-of-state solid waste-often
allowing disposal of in-state waste while restricting, or even
banning, disposal of out-of-state waste."9 In City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey,0 the Court applied the dormant Commerce
Clause antidiscrimination test to one such law, invalidating a
state ban on importation of solid waste. In City of Philadelphia,
the first part of the antidiscrimination test was satisfied easily:
Neither party disputed that in-state solid waste and out-of-state
solid waste competed for the same landfill space.4 The second
requirement-that the discrimination harmed the national econ-
omy-went unanalyzed. Instead, consistent with its neoclassical
view of economics, the Court assumed that such discrimination
necessarily harmed interstate commerce.42
This Article uses a game known as the "Prisoner's Dilemma"
REv. 1481, 1487-93 (1995); Anthony P. Farrell, Obstacles to the Formation of Solid
Waste Landfills in Missouri, 2 MO. ENVTL. L. & PoLY REV. 134, 134 (1995) ("While
the capacity of landfills continues to decrease, the volume of wastes that need to be
handled has risen."); Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Oregon Waste Systems,
Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 43, 43
(1995) ("The United States generates a great deal of solid waste."); Patrick C.
McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 O1. L. REV. 409, 438 (1992) ("In ever-in-
creasing quantities, garbage is being disposed of at landfills across the country, not
withstanding efforts by state legislatures to reduce its volume."); Philip Weinberg,
Congress, the Courts, and Solid Waste Transport: Good Fences Don't Always Make
Good Neighbors, 25 ENVTL. L. 57, 57 (1995) ("We are awash in a tide of solid waste
that shows few signs of abating."); Jonathan Phillip Meyers, Note, Confronting the
Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal
Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 567-70 (1991).
38. See Engel, supra note 37, at 1495-500; Weinberg, supra note 37, at 57 ("As
the tide of solid waste mounts, states and localities have attempted to legislate to
prevent or discourage the importation of waste . . ").
39. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 96 (noting the state placed an addi-
tional surcharge on out-of-state waste disposed of in-state); Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336 (1992) (noting that the state placed an addi-
tional fee on hazardous waste generated outside of the state); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, 504 U.S. at 355-58 (explaining how a county prohibited disposal of solid
waste generated outside of the county).
40. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
41. See id. at 619-20.
42. See id. at 627-29.
19981 ECONOMICS OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 1201
to analyze state regulation of solid waste disposal. Part II ex-
plains and analyzes the Prisoner's Dilemma in detail;" howev-
er, a brief description here is necessary. In the Prisoner's Dilem-
ma, two actors face a set of incentives that lead each of them,
acting rationally and in their own self-interest, to choose a
course of action that leaves each worse off than if the two had
been able to cooperate." Consequently, the Prisoner's Dilemma
results in suboptimal behavior. Part III explains that City of
Philadelphia forces states into a Prisoner's Dilemma by prohibit-
ing discrimination between in-state and out-of-state solid
waste." Because they are in a Prisoner's Dilemma, the
states-acting rationally and competing freely-will act in a way
that leaves all states worse off than if they were allowed to dis-
criminate against out-of-state waste. The Prisoner's Dilemma
created by the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases leaves
the national solid waste problem worse than if states were al-
lowed to discriminate against out-of-state waste. Without the
prohibition of discrimination, interstate commerce would not
only be unharmed but would actually benefit.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the devel-
opment of the dormant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination
test. History shows that an important first principle underlies
the Court's case law-that states should not discriminate be-
tween in-state and out-of-state competitors to the detriment of
the national economy. This first principle yields the two require-
ments of the antidiscrimination test. A state regulation of inter-
state commerce is unconstitutional if: (1) state law discriminates
between in-state and out-of-state competitors, and (2) the dis-
crimination harms the efficiency of the national economy. Part I
concludes by analyzing City of Philadelphia, in which the Court
conflated these two requirements by assuming that discrimina-
tion between competitors necessarily harms the national econo-
my. In doing so, the Court embraced the neoclassical view of
economics.
43. See infra notes 239-67 and accompanying text.
44. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 34; MAXwELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW- READINGs AND COMMENTARY 118 (1997) ("[Tihe two
prisoner's . . . end up . . . in the position that, in the aggregate, is worse for both").
45. See infra Part III.E.
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Part II explains the Prisoner's Dilemma situation and what
that game tells us about strategic behavior. The Prisoner's Di-
lemma undermines neoclassical economic assumptions, illustrat-
ing that strategic behavior can lead self-interested, rational eco-
nomic actors, competing freely, to less preferred outcomes. Part
III then explains how the Court's decision in City of Philadel-
phia, which prohibits state discrimination between in-state and
out-of-state waste, forces states into a Prisoner's Dilemma. Part
IV offers a remedy to get the states out of their Prisoner's Di-
lemma-overrule City of Philadelphia. Part IV then concludes
that City of Philadelphia is a symptom of the Court's flawed eco-
nomic assumptions. Instead of adopting a blanket neoclassical
view of economics, the Court should allow litigants to argue that
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state competitors
does not decrease the efficiency of the national market.
I. DISCRIMINATION AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
DOCTRINE
Congress's power to "regulate Commerce... among the sever-
al States" lies at the heart of the Constitution's federalist de-
sign, placing limits on both federal and state power." The Com-
merce Clause-along with the other federal legislative powers
listed in Article I-simultaneously grants and limits federal
power. Although the Clause grants power to Congress, the act of
enumerating legislative powers implies that Congress's power is
limited to those granted by the Constitution.4"
46. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-2, at 403.
47. The opening phrase of Article I suggests that Congress's power is not plena-
ry: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the Unit-
ed States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). The Tenth Amendment succinctly restates the
point: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Id. amend. X. In addition to the enumerated powers, Congress has the authority to
exercise any implied powers necessary to fully implement the enumerated powers.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409-10 (1819). Of course, the
notion of enumerated and limited federal power has become obscured by the great
expansion of Congress's Commerce Clause power during this century. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 166; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 237 (James
Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) ("The powers delegated by the proposed constitution
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The Commerce Clause restricts state power in two main ways.
First, Congress can preempt state law by enactinga statute un-
der its Commerce Clause power.48 Second, the Commerce
Clause implicitly restricts states from regulating interstate com-
merce.49 Preemption derives directly from the Constitution's
text, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI,' ° but the basis for the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is less apparent. There is no
textual basis for the doctrine,5' and the historical evidence is at
best inconclusive.52 Indeed, for much of its first century, the Su-
to the federal government, are few and defined."); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WArrB 17-19 (1937); TRME, supra
note 3, § 5-2, at 298 ("The Constitution, in granting congressional power, . . . simul-
taneously limits it."); Eule, supra note 6, at 430; H. Jefferson -Powell, The Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 658 (1993); see also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-61 (1995) (discussing the "first principles" and
development of the Commerce Clause doctrine); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (same); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 297 ("The Supreme Court has in recent
years largely abandoned any effort to articulate and enforce internal limits on con-
gressional power-limits inherent in the grants of power themselves.").
48. See Drummonds, supra note 4, at 529-30; McGreal, supra note 4, at 830-41;
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see supra note 4.
51. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-2, at 403 (stating that the Constitution does not
"explicitly limit state interference with interstate commerce"); Collins, supra note 10,
at 51 ("The dormant commerce power doctrine has no direct support in the text of
the Constitution.").
52. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 47, at 13 ("The conception that the mere grant
of the commerce power to Congress dislodged state power finds no expression" in ei-
ther the drafting convention or the state ratifying conventions); Collins, supra note
10, at 55 ("[The case in favor of the dormant commerce power doctrine rests on in-
conclusive inferences about the Constitution."); Eule, supra note 6, at 434. But see
Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Con-
temporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 493 (1941) ("On the whole, the evidence
supports the view that, as to the restricted field which was deemed at the time to
constitute regulation of commerce, the grant of power to the federal government pre-
supposed the withdrawal of authority . . . from the states."). A piece of historical ev-
idence often cited in support of the dormant Commerce Clause is a passage from a
letter written by James Madison:
lilt is very certain that [Congress's power over interstate commerce] grew
out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-
importing, and was intended as a negative and preventive provision
against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to
be used for positive purposes of the General Government, in which alone,
however, the remedial power could be lodged.
Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE REcoRDs OF
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preme Court wrestled with whether it should recognize such a
doctrine. Even after the Court adopted a dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, many questions remained.3 Are states allowed
to regulate any portion of interstate commerce? If so, what is the
scope of the limitation on state action? Which portions of inter-
state commerce can states regulate and how may they do so?
The remainder of Part I discusses these questions by examining
the evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination test.
Essentially, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination cases divide into three chronological group-
ings. The first group begins with the Court's disagreement over
whether the Commerce Clause implicitly limits state power to
regulate interstate commerce.' The first group ends with the
Court's recognition of such a limit on state power.55 This group of
cases provides background, orienting the reader within the con-
stitutional terrain discussed in the following two groups of cases.
In the second group of cases, the Court announced that the
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits some state discrimination
against interstate commerce.56 These cases establish the first
principle of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter RE-
CORDS]; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct.
1590, 1596 n.7 (1997) (citing Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell, supra); West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (same). This passage,
however, does not explain which branch of government is supposed to exercise the
negative on state laws. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1617 n.7
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Because the Commerce Clause is phrased as a grant of power
to Congress, the most logical reading of the Clause is that Congress possesses the
negative power of the Clause. See id. ("Madison's reference to the Clause as granting
a 'power' strongly suggests that he was merely asserting that the Convention designed
the Clause more to enable 'the General Government,' namely, Congress, to negate state
laws impeding commerce . . ."); Collins, supra note 10, at 54-55.
53. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-5, at 408 ("Since the mid-1930s, the Supreme
Court has sought to clarify the process by which it determines whether state regu-
lation is prohibited by the commerce clause.").
54. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The License Cases,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
55. See Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
56. See infra Part I.B.1.
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antidiscrimination test: States may not discriminate between in-
state and out-of-state competitors in a way that harms the wel-
fare of the national economy. This first principle, in turn, yields
the two requirements of the antidiscrimination test: (1) a state
must not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state competi-
tors, and (2) the discrimination must not harm the welfare of
the national economy. Under this test, state law can discrimi-
nate between in-state and out-of-state competitors if the discrim-
ination does not harm the welfare of the national market.7
The third group of cases shows the Court adopting a virtual
per se rule against discrimination between in-state and out-of-
state competitors.58 Under this rule, a state may discriminate
against out-of-state competitors only if the in-state items of com-
merce are different from the out-of-state items of commerce in a
way relevant to the government's regulatory purpose.59 These
cases still require that in-state and out-of-state actors compete
with one another. The second requirement-that the discrimina-
tion harm the welfare of the national economy-is not men-
tioned. Instead, the Court merges the two requirements, assum-
ing that discrimination between in-state and out-of-state com-
petitors necessarily harms the national economy. In Part III, we
see how the neoclassical economic assumptions of this last group
of cases forces the states into a Prisoner's Dilemma.
A. Group One-Early Disagreement and Adoption
For most of its first century, the Supreme Court interpreted
and applied the Commerce Clause solely as a grant of power to
Congress. Throughout this period, parties argued, without
57. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997); Alaska v. Arctic
Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949); Baldwin v. GJAF. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
58. See infra Part I.C.1.
59. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); City of Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
60. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The License Cases,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); CuRRIE,
supra note 11, at 168-86, 222-37; Earl M. Maltz, The Impact of the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937 on the Dormant Commerce Clause-A Case Study in the Decline
of State Autonomy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 121, 123 (1995).
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success, that the Commerce Clause also should be read as an
implied restriction on state power.6' This dormant Commerce
Clause argument was made in both a weak and a strong form.
The strong version held that states could not enact any regula-
tion of interstate commerce; Congress had exclusive power over
the subject.62 The weak version held that the states were re-
strained only partly from regulating interstate commerce.' Un-
der the weak version, the main issue was-and to this day
is-deciding precisely what implicit limits the Commerce Clause
placed on state regulation of interstate commerce."
The first mention of a dormant aspect of the Commerce
Clause came in Gibbons v. Ogden.6" In Gibbons, New York had
granted a monopoly for operation of ferries in New York wa-
ters.66 The holder of the monopoly subsequently licensed Ogden
to run a ferry between New York Harbor and New Jersey. 7
Without approval from New York, Gibbons opened a competing
ferry line, and Ogden immediately sought an injunction to stop
Gibbons's unauthorized ferry.68 In opposing the injunction, Gib-
bons argued, among other things, that the New York monopoly
was an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce be-
cause Congress had the exclusive power over that subject.69
Although Chief Justice John Marshall ultimately disposed of
Gibbons on other grounds,7 he did remark on Gibbons's dor-
61. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 304-08; The License Cases, 46 U.S. at
525.
62. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 288 (recounting that the plaintiff argued
that the state law regulated interstate commerce and "that Congress possesses the
exclusive power of making such a regulation"); The License Cases, 46 U.S. at 543
(recounting that the plaintiff argued "the exclusive power of Congress, under the
constitution, to regulate commerce . . . among the States"); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 13-
14; TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-2, at 403 ("The controversy has ultimately been framed
by asking whether, as a general rule or in selected instances, the nature of the pow-
er vested in Congress requires its exclusive exercise by that body."); Maltz, supra
note 60, at 123 (stating that some justices were "committed to the concept of exclu-
sive federal authority").
63. See Maltz, supra note 60, at 124.
64. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
65. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
66. See id. at 2-3.
67. See id. at 2.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 13-14.
70. Chief Justice Marshall held that a federal statute regulating the navigation
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mant Commerce Clause argument." After summarizing the ar-
gument, Marshall stated: "There is great force in this argument,
and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted."72
Though dicta, this observation by the esteemed Chief Justice
fueled the coming debate over the dormant Commerce Clause
and, at least initially, framed the issue as whether Congress had
exclusive power over interstate commerce.7
For about three decades after Gibbons, several Justices urged
recognition of a dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but a ma-
jority never formed around such a doctrine. 4 Nevertheless, sev-
of interstate waters preempted New York's grant of a monopoly. See id. at 200. Be-
cause New York's action conflicted with an exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
power, the Court did not need to address Gibbons's dormant Commerce Clause ar-
gument. See id.
71. Justice William Johnson's concurrence fully addressed the dormant Commerce
Clause issue. See id at 227-38 (Johnson, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 209.
73. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 11, at 574-77. Marshall's successor, Chief
Justice Roger Brooke Taney, referred to Gibbons as "the case usually referred to and
relied on to prove the exclusive power of Congress and the prohibition to the
States." The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 581 (1847).
74. A count of the votes in the Licenses Cases shows four votes against any
negative or dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause. See The License Cases, 46 U.S.
at 581; see also CURRIE, supra note 11, at 226 ("[Flour of the seven Justices who
voted flatly and persuasively declared that the commerce clause did not limit state
power."). The arguments against a dormant Commerce Clause find considerable
support in the text and structure of the Constitution. Parts of the Constitution spe-
cifically negate state power, implying that states have power unless specifically with-
drawn by the Constitution. For example, the Constitution both prohibits states from
coining money, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; and grants such a power to Con-
gress. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. If a grant of power to Congress implicitly restricted
state power, then the grant of federal power to "coin money" also should have re-
stricted state power to do so. But, because the framers included a specific provision
prohibiting states from coining money, we infer that the Framers did not intend a
grant of power to carry a corresponding negative of state power. Rather, the states
retained concurrent power with Congress unless the Constitution specifically provided
otherwise. If Congress wants to exercise its Commerce Clause power to negate spe-
cific state action, then the Supremacy Clause ensures that congressional action will
supersede state law. See id. art VI, cl. 2.
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Roger Brooke Taney was a strong and con-
sistent opponent of the dormant Commerce Clause. See The Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470-71 (1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S. at 578-86; CURRIE, su-
pra note 11, at 204-10, 222-34; FRANKFURTER, supra note 47, at 50; R. KENT
NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 101-08 (1968); TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 6-3, at 405 ("Taney... advanced the view that the commerce
clause left states free to regulate as they wished so long as their actions did not
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eral Justices, in separate opinions, began articulating a basis for
such a doctrine. 5 At this stage, it was argued that certain mat-
ters were inherently national and thus required national legisla-
tion; the states were to regulate inherently local matters.7" The
initial focus of dormant Commerce Clause arguments was the
object of the state's regulation-that is, whether it was national
or local.
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,77 a majority of the Court fi-
nally joined in an opinion recognizing a dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. The Court adopted a weak version of the doc-
trine, allowing some state regulation of interstate commerce.7"
Following the logic of their predecessors, the majority distin-
guished between aspects of commerce that required a "national
solution"-and thus could only be regulated by Congress-and
aspects of commerce that permitted a diversity of ap-
proaches-and thus could be regulated by the states.7"
conflict with validly enacted federal legislation."); Collins, supra note 10, at 49.
75. For example, Justice John McLean wrote several separate opinions express-
ing his belief that Congress's Commerce Clause power was exclusive. See The Pas-
senger Cases, 48 U.S. at 393-400; The License Cases, 46 U.S. at 587-95; Groves v.
Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 504, 506-08 (1841).
76. See Maltz, supra note 60, at 124-27; see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 471-73 (1875) (claiming that the railroad was in-
herently a local matter); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20
(1851) (explaining that a law governing ship pilots in the Port of Philadelphia did
not require national regulation).
77. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). It is this author's view that Cooley actually
rested on a preemption rationale and that the dormant Commerce Clause was first
recognized later in Reading Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
The best reading of Cooley, however, is the subject of another piece. For present
purposes, it is sufficient that the Supreme Court and most commentators have
treated Cooley as the original adoption of the doctrine. See CURRIE, supra note 11,
at 232 (calling the Court's recognition of a dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause
"a revolution"); NEWMYER, supra note 74, at 105 (stating that Cooley brought "some
constitutional order into [the Court's] interpretation of the commerce power"); TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 6-4, at 406-07; Collins, supra note 10, at 49 (citing Cooley as "a
basic precedent for the dormant commerce clause"); Maltz, supra note 60, at 124;
Redish & Nugent, supra note 11, at 577 ("[I]t was not until Cooley v. Board of War-
dens that the [dormant Commerce Clause] doctrine became firmly established in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.").
78. See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
79. See id. ("Whatever subjects of [Congress's Commerce Clause] power are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly
be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.").
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The Court's division between local and national commerce
persisted as the basis for dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
through much of the nineteenth century." During that period,
though, the Court began to discuss an alternate basis for the
doctrine. In one case, the Court invalidated a state law that im-
posed a tax on railway freight carried anywhere through the
state.8 ' In its holding, the Court wrote:
It is of national importance that... there should be but one
regulating power, for if one State can... tax persons or prop-
erty passing through it,... every other may, and thus com-
mercial intercourse between States remote from each other
may be destroyed.... [Flor though it might bear the imposi-
tion of a single tax, it would be crushed under the load of
many.
8 2
In this passage, the Court shifted the focus of the dormant Com-
merce Clause from the nature of the commerce at issue, local
versus national, to the effect of state law on interstate commerce.
The Court was concerned that certain state regulations of inter-
state commerce-such as a tax on the movement of goods-could
harm ("crush") the flow of interstate commerce;s in doing so,
states would harm the nation. As the next section discusses, the
focus on the effect upon interstate commerce is now a mainstay of
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
80. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-4, at 407; Maltz, supra note 60, at 124-27;
McGinley, supra note 37, at 414-15.
81. See Reading R.R., 82 U.S. at 281-82.
82. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
83. At first glance, the Import-Export Clause, which prohibits any state from
imposing any "Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2,
seems to prohibit such a state tax. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the
Import-Export Clause applies only to foreign commerce, not interstate commerce. See
Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 131-37 (1868). But see Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1620-28 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Woodruff was decided incorrectly and that the Import-
Export Clause should apply to interstate commerce).
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B. Group Two-Antidiscrimination First Principles
During its second century, the Court developed its modern
dormant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination test. This section
traces the test from its birth and infancy in the 1930s and 1940s
and identifies the first principles that underlie the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. The next section explains how the
third group of cases have betrayed first principles.
1. The Development of the Antidiscrimination Test
The Court's antidiscrimination test grew out of two cases chal-
lenging New York milk regulations.' The first case, Baldwin v.
GA.F. Seelig, Inc.," involved the New York Milk Control Act,
which set minimum prices that all milk dealers were to pay to
New York milk producers."8 The law was enacted to protect
New York milk producers from competition with out-of-state
producers who charged lower prices.87 To prevent competition,
the Act prohibited retail sale of any milk purchased for less than
the price set by the Act.8 New York milk dealers challenged
the law under the dormant Commerce Clause. 9
In a much cited opinion by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the
Court struck down New York's minimum price law. 0 According
to Justice Cardozo, the Commerce Clause prohibits a state law
that burdens interstate commerce "when the avowed purpose of
the [law], as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or
mitigate the consequences of competition between the states."91
Under Baldwin, a state law unconstitutionally burdens inter-
state commerce when it protects in-state actors from competition
84. See Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from Eco-
nomic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 346 (1995)
('[M]uch of the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence can be
written in milk.").
85. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
86. See id. at 519.
87. See id. at 527.
88. See id. at 519.
89. See id. at 520-21.
90. See id. at 527-28.
91. Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
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with out-of-state firms.92 The Court's concern was, therefore,
not with the effect of state law on interstate commerce general-
ly-virtually all state laws have some impact, direct or indirect,
on the national economy. Rather, the focus was on disparate
treatment of in-state and out-of-state firms that competed with
one another.
Next, Baldwin focused the dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis on the negative consequences that might follow state protec-
tionism. As the Court explained, these consequences played a
major role in the history and purpose of the Commerce
Clause." The Commerce Clause-and the Philadelphia Conven-
tion generally-was in part a response to the Articles of Confed-
eration," which did not grant the Continental Congress power
to regulate interstate commerce." Without any central regula-
tion of interstate commerce, states waged economic warfare.96
The Founders particularly focused on conflicts between states
that produced and exported goods and some coastal states whose
main commerce was the trade that flowed through their ports.9"
92. See id. at 527.
93. See id. at 521-23.
94. See A. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
137-47 (1936); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4647 (1996) (discussing James Madison's critique of
the Articles of Confederation); Collins, supra note 10, at 53 ("Interstate rivalry was
the Convention's greatest concern."). As Gordon Wood pointed out, although the inad-
equacies of the Articles of Confederation may explain why the Philadelphia Conven-
tion convened to amend that document, those problems do not explain fully the push
for an entirely new document. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in
the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CON-
STITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 72 (Richard Beeman et al. eds.,
1987). An additional impetus toward a new Constitution came from the petty politics
practiced by the state governments of the time. In the view of the Framers, state
governments were promoting personal, selfish interests at the expense of the public
good. See WOOD, supra, at 393-425.
95. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (setting forth the powers of "[tihe
United States in Congress assembled").
96. See Collins, supra note 10, at 53.
97. See MAX FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF THE CONSTTIION 29-30 (1921); Abel,
supra note 52, at 44849; Collins, supra note 10, at 53; Letter from James Madison
to Prof. Davis (1832), in 3 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 519, 542.
[Tihe states were using their imposts as weapons against each other, ei-
ther offensively, as where the importing states imposed tariffs the ulti-
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A state with little resources other than its location as a trade
center could exact a great toll to allow the passage of goods to
other states or foreign markets." Many states did so by either
closing their ports to or imposing prohibitive taxes on goods from
other states. 9 In doing so, the taxing states pursued their own
economic advantage at the expense of their neighbors. 100
mate incidence of which was calculated to fall on others not blessed by
geography with as' good and accessible harbors, or defensively, as by
strengthening their tariff walls against each other to compensate for reve-
nue deficiencies resulting from diversion of foreign shipments to the
states with the least onerous imposts.
Collins, supra note 10, at 53.
98. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed.,
1987) ("The state less favourably circumstanced, would be desirous of escaping from
the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more
fortunate neighbours."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 215 (James Madison)
(Max Beloff ed., 1987) (discussing the need for a "superintending authority" over the
trade between states).
99. See DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHU-
SETTS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted in 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 59 (Jonathan Elliott ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) (1836) [hereinafter
DEBATES]; DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 4, re-
printed in DEBATES, supra, at 20, 254; DEBATES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFED-
ERATION 5, reprinted in DEBATES, supra, at 19; DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION 5, reprinted in, DEBATES, supra, at 119; DAVID HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 102-04 (1975). Lack of a central commerce power also ham-
pered the nation's ability to conduct foreign trade. See RAKOVE, supra note 94, at
26-27. Shortly after the Revolutionary War, Britain closed its ports to American
ships. See id. To regain access, the United States wanted to implement a national
response, closing its ports to British ships until such time as Britain reopened its
ports. See id. Because the federal government did not have power over the subject,
the coastal states acted in their best interests by keeping their ports open, and the
United States could not coordinate a successful response.
100. DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 3, reprint-
ed in DEBATES, supra note 99, at 483 (arguing that "if the states had the exclusive
imposition of duties on exports, they might raise a heavy contribution from other
states, for their own exclusive emolument"). Cardozo described how laws like the
New York Milk Act could lead to such consequences:
If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers,
may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont,
the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to
be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of
the nation.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1934). Imposing such "customs duties"
at state borders would "neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin." Id.
at 527.
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The exploitive state taxes were of concern because they posed
several negative consequences for the new nation. First, if goods
could be taxed as they passed through each state border, trade
would effectively cease; each tax would increase the price of the
good to the point that it would no longer be purchased.'0 ' Sec-
ond, the border taxes might cause producing states to choose
alternate, less efficient trade routes to avoid exploitation." 2
Third, trade wars could escalate into violence.' In each case,
opposition to exploitive state action focused on the consequences
for national trade-economic or other factors would harm the
welfare of the national economy.'
The Court in Baldwin echoed the Framers's concern with the
consequences of state exploitation of interstate commerce. Ac-
cording to the Court, to allow such exploitation would be
to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity. The Consti-
tution was framed under the dominion of a political philoso-
phy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim to-
gether, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are
in union and not division.l"
State protectionism was feared because of its threat to national
"prosperity."' 6 Protectionism threatened prosperity because it
would "suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition
between the states""0 7 and "neutralize the economic conse-
101. See Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 280 (1872).
102. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 98, at 215 (claiming that state taxes
could cause exporting states "to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign
trade").
103. See id. (claiming that retaliatory trade measures 'would nourish unceasing
animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public
tranquility"); THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 98, at 28.
104. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 398-99.
105. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added); see id. at 522 (stating that the
Commerce Clause addresses "the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, tak-
ing form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.") (citations omitted); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 98; Coenen, supra note 16, at 398-99; Jonathan D.
Varat, State 'Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 518 (1981).
106. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
107. Id. at 522.
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quences of free trade among the states."'0 5 Conversely, free
trade among the states would promote the economic welfare of
the nation."9
Baldwin makes clear that interstate competition was not val-
ued as an end in itself, but rather as a means to other benefits,
such as greater "prosperity." Underlying this view is the neoclas-
sical economic assumption that free competition necessarily
leads to the efficiency that brings prosperity." ° If that assump-
tion does not hold, however, then disruption of interstate compe-
tition might not threaten national prosperity.
In the next milk case, H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond,"' the Court reviewed a New York law that required a
license to operate a milk processing plant within the state."
Most of the licensing criteria related to the quality of the pro-
cessing operations or the financial responsibility of the opera-
tor;"' Hood satisfied all of these criteria."' New York,
however, denied Hood a license based on another criterion: issu-
ance of a license must "not tend to a destructive competition" in
the local milk market."' The New York licensing authority be-
lieved that Hood's new facility would purchase New York milk
for sale outside of New York, mostly in Boston." 6 Because
Hood also supplied an out-of-state market, granting it a license
would increase competition for New York milk and consequently
raise in-state milk prices."' New York had denied Hood a li-
cense solely to hold down New York milk prices.
108. Id. at 526.
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed.,
1987) ("An unrestrained intercourse between states themselves, will advance the
trade of each .... The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will
acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of ev-
ery part.").
110. This point is explored further infra Part I.C.2.-3.
111. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
112. See id. at 527.
113. For example, one provision of the law required "that the applicant [be] quali-
fied by character, experience, financial responsibility and equipment to properly con-
duct the proposed business." Id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 528.
116. See id. at 528-29.
117. See id.
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Once again, the Court was unsympathetic to New York's dif-
ferential treatment of in-state and out-of-state competiton. Ac-
cording to the Court, the New York licensing provision was en-
acted "solely [for] protection of local economic interests, such as
supply for local consumption and limitation of competition.""'
Such state exploitation of interstate commerce is prohibited by
the Commerce Clause: "the State may not promote its own eco-
nomic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate com-
merce."" 9 As in Baldwin, the Court first focused on the state's
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state competitors. 20
Next, as in Baldwin, the Court focused on the consequences
for the national economy of the state's discriminatory law:
The material success that has come to inhabitants of the
states which make up this federal free trade unit has been
the most impressive in the history of commerce, but the es-
tablished interdependence of the states only emphasizes the
necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against
local burdens and repressions. We need only consider the con-
sequences if each of the few states that produce copper, lead,
high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas should decree
that industries located in that state shall have priority. What
fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals would ensue
if such practices were begun!.2 .
118. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 532.
120. Also, as in Baldwin, the Court attributed this principle to the founding era
and the underlying impetus for the Commerce Clause. As noted in H.P. Hood &
Sons, the economic opportunism practiced by the states after the revolution threat-
ened the continuing survival of the nascent nation. See id. at 533 ("When victory
relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity that war had exerted, a drift
toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began."). A federal power
over interstate commerce was thought necessary to keep the peace:
The sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ulti-
mately produced the Constitution was "to take into consideration the
trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and trade
of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their com-
mercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their
permanent harmony" and for that purpose the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia in January of 1786 named commissioners and proposed their meet-
ing with those from other states.
Id.
121. Id. at 538-39 (emphasis added).
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State interference with interstate competition is not inherently
problematic; it is of concern only when its "consequence" is di-
minishment of the nation's "material success." 2' The free flow
of interstate commerce is not an end in itself; it is an instrumen-
tal good, valued for its contribution to the efficient operation of
the national economy.
In sum, Baldwin and Hood demonstrate that two connected
principles underlie the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
First, states should not be allowed to interfere with interstate
competition for the benefit of local economic interests. Second,
the Commerce Clause was intended to address the negative con-
sequences of such state action for the national economy.
2. The Competition Principle
Two contemporary dormant Commerce Clause cases empha-
size that discrimination between in-state and out-of-state com-
merce, without more, is not unconstitutional; the in-state and
out-of-state commerce must at least be in competition. In the
first case, Alaska v. Arctic Maid,' Alaska had imposed a high-
er tax on salmon transported out-of-state than salmon transport-
ed in-state for processing."2 Salmon destined for interstate
commerce was caught by special ships equipped with on-board
facilities for freezing salmon for shipment to processing facilities
outside Alaska."5 The other salmon was transported back to
Alaska for processing and sale in-state. 126 The out-of-state
salmon producers challenged Alaska's differential tax under the
dormant Commerce Clause. 27
The Supreme Court upheld Alaska's differential tax because it
did not advantage in-state business over out-of-state busi-
122. Id. at 535 ("[Tlhis Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this
Nation" by applying the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
123. 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
124. See id. at 203.
125. See id. at 201.
126. See id. at 204.
127. See id.
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ness."z The Court noted specifically that the in-state salmon
processors did "not compete" with the out-of-state processors;
each supplied a different market. 129 Because in-state and out-
of-state commerce were not in competition, the Court held that
"cases... which hold invalid state laws that prefer local sales
over interstate sales, are inapposite."3 ' This makes much
sense given the Court's reasoning in Baldwin and Hood. In
those two cases, the Court focused not on mere discrimination
against interstate commerce, but on exploitation of interstate
commerce for the benefit of in-state commerce.'' When in-
state and out-of-state actors do not compete, a burden on out-of-
state actors does not advantage in-state actors. Arctic Maid was
thus a logical elaboration of the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.
The Supreme Court applied Arctic Maid last term in General
Motors Corp. v. Tracy."' In Tracy, Ohio had levied a five per-
cent tax on all natural gas transactions, except those involving
local distribution companies (LDC)."' LDCs serve as an inter-
mediary between natural gas suppliers and end-users and gener-
ally serve customers with small gas needs, such as residential
consumers. " Natural gas suppliers, however, generally sell
gas directly to large volume end-users, such as corporations and
municipalities."5 Under the Ohio natural gas tax, only in-state
utilities qualified as tax-exempt LDCs."' Ohio effectively im-
posed different tax burdens on in-state and out-of-state natural
gas suppliers.
General Motors, a customer of an out-of-state utility subject to
the Ohio tax, challenged the discriminatory tax scheme as a vio-
128. See id.
129. See id The out-of-state actors had not attempted to enter the in-state mar-
ket and had no desire to do so. See Brief for Respondents at 27-33, Arctic Maid (No.
106).
130. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. at 204-05.
131. See supra Part I.B.1.
132. 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997).
133. See id. at 816.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See i&
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lation of the dormant Commerce Clause.'37 General Motors ar-
gued that the tax differential gave LDCs a relatively lower tax
burden that, in turn, gave the LDCs a competitive advan-
tage."8 The Ohio tax presumably increased the price of natural
gas sold by out-of-state suppliers, making the LDCs' product
relatively more attractive. Under this argument, the Ohio tax
exploited interstate commerce through taxation of out-of-state
suppliers for the competitive advantage of in-state economic
interests. General Motors, then, invoked the antidiscrimination
principle established by the Court's prior cases.
The Court focused on the key assumption of General Motors's
antidiscrimination argument: that LDCs and out-of-state natural
gas suppliers actually compete with one another.3 9 If LDCs
and out-of-state suppliers appealed to different markets, LDCs
would not derive a competitive advantage from the increased
prices of out-of-state suppliers. The Court explained this point in
the following passage:
Conceptually, of course, any notion of discrimination as-
sumes a comparison of substantially similar entities. Al-
though this central assumption has more often than not itself
remained dormant in this Court's opinions on state discrimi-
nation subject to review under the dormant Commerce
Clause, when the allegedly competing entities provide differ-
ent products, as here, there is a threshold question whether
the companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional
purposes. This is so for the simple reason that the difference
in products may mean that the different entities serve differ-
ent markets, and would continue to do so even if the suppos-
edly discriminatory burden were removed. If in fact that
should be the case, eliminating the tax or other regulatory
differential would not serve the dormant Commerce Clause's
fundamental objective of preserving a national market for
competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred
137. See id. at 817.
138. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Tracy (No. 95-1232) ("This system of taxation cre-
ates a preference for gas sold by an Ohio public utility-and, correspondingly, it
creates a disincentive to purchase gas from any other source, including all out-of-
state sources.").
139. See Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 824.
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by a State upon its residents or resident competitors."
This much was familiar from Arctic Maid."
Next, the Court had to determine whether LDCs and out-of-
state suppliers served the same market. To answer this ques-
tion, the Court had to explain the main business of LDCs and
out-of-state suppliers. LDCs are heavily regulated entities that
serve as intermediaries between suppliers and end-users, offer-
ing natural gas bundled with other services, such as a guarantee
of continuous, uninterrupted service.' LDCs largely serve in-
dividual consumers, who do not have the flexibility" or vol-
ume of demand' to purchase natural gas on the open market.
Out-of-state suppliers, however, generally supply large end-us-
ers-such as General Motors-who do not require bundled nat-
ural gas service. 45 The core customers of the LDC and out-of-
state supplier, then, appear to come from different markets-
residential versus large-demand customers. Yet, as the Court
recognized, these two core customer groups do not exhaust the
universe of possible customers; rather, they lie at opposite ends
of a spectrum. 46 Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum lie
customers large enough to purchase on the open market, but
140. Id.
141. See id. at 825-26.
142. See id. at 822-23, 825-26.
143. For example, consumers who rely on open market purchases risk supply
shortages and even stoppage in service. Individual consumers cannot easily endure
or plan for such service interruptions. See id. at 825 (noting that LDC customers
"are buyers who live on sufficiently tight budgets to make the stability of rate im-
portant, and who cannot readily bear the risk of losing a fuel supply in harsh nat-
ural or economic weather."); Adam D. Samuels, Reliability of Natural Gas Service for
Captive End-Users Under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order No.
636, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 749 (1994) ("Gas service disruption lasting just a
few days can cause severe health risks to captive end-users.").
144. See Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 825 (stating that LDC customers are "buyers with-
out the high volume requirements needed to make investment in the transaction
costs of individual purchases on the open market economically feasible"); Richard
Pierce, Intrastate Natural Gas Regulation: An Alternative Perspective, 9 YALE J. ON
REG. 407, 409-10 (1992) ("Purchasing gas service [on the open market] requires con-
siderable time and expertise. Its benefits are likely to exceed its costs only for con-
sumers who purchase very large quantities of gas.").
145. See Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 826.
14. See id.
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small enough to derive some benefit from the LDCs' bundled
services. "  For this group of customers, a price differential be-
tween LDCs and out-of-state suppliers might affect their pur-
chasing decisions. " 8
Tracy posed a crucial difference from Arctic Maid: the in-state
and out-of-state markets were not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive; some overlap may have existed. The question was whether
General Motors had made a sufficient showing of overlapping
markets to require application of the dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination test.49 The Court answered "no." 50 The
extent of the overlap, if any, depended on facts not before the
Court'5' as well as economic predictions about whether treat-
ing LDCs and out-of-state suppliers the same would increase or
decrease competition.'52 Given this uncertainty, the Court de-
ferred to the state's decision to treat LDCs and out-of-state sup-
pliers differently.'53 The Court did so out of institutional com-
petence concerns."5 Courts generally do not have the fact-gath-
ering capability or expertise to engage in economic forecasting:
The degree to which these very general suggestions might
prove right or wrong ... is not really significant; the point
is simply that all of them are nothing more than sugges-
tions, pointedly couched in terms of assumption or suppo-
sition. This is necessarily so, simply because the Court is
institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which eco-
147. See id. ("[Clonsumers of middling volumes of natural gas who found some
value in Ohio's state-imposed protections but not enough to offset lower price at
some point" were at the middle of the spectrum).
148. See id. ("ere is . .. a further market where the respective sellers of the
bundled and unbundled products apparently do compete and may compete further.").
149. See id. ("[Tihe question raised by this case is whether the opportunities for
competition between [out-of-state suppliers] and LDCs ... requires treating [them]
alike for dormant Commerce Clause purposes.").
150. See id. at 829.
151. For example, the Court did not have any information indicating the size of
the shared market. See id. ("[T]he record before this Court reveals virtually nothing
about the details of that competitive market.").
152. For example, would removing the sales tax on out-of-state suppliers increase
competition with LDCs or lead to other state regulation that would strengthen the
position of the LDCs? See id. at 828.
153. See id. at 828-29.
154. See id.
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nomic predictions can be made, and professionally un-
trained to make them.'55
The legislative branch, however, is well equipped to handle the
task: "Congress has the capacity to investigate and analyze
facts beyond anything the judiciary could match, joined with
the authority of the commerce power to run economic risks
that the judiciary should confront only when the constitutional
or statutory mandate for judicial choice is clear."'56 Conse-
quently, Tracy limits the role of the Court to police interstate
commerce to clear cases.15
7
Tracy ultimately reinforces one dormant Commerce Clause
principle and establishes another. First, Tracy reinforces that
the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned only with state
regulation that discriminates between in-state and out-of-state
competitors. Second, the Court placed the burden on the party
challenging the state regulation to show that the in-state and
out-of-state actors actually compete. If the challenger's argu-
ments rely on incomplete facts or contested economic predic-
tions, then the Court will defer to the state's judgment that
the discrimination is justified.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause First Principles
Baldwin, Hood, Arctic Maid, and Tracy crystallize two princi-
ples that undergird the dormant Commerce Clause. First, the
Commerce Clause-in both its affirmative and negative as-
pects-is concerned with state interference with interstate com-
petition. The Founders feared that-states might exploit interstate
commerce for local advantage.'58 Discrimination against out-of-
state commerce, without more, is not the target; only discrimina-
tion between in-state and out-of-state competitors is targeted.
Second, the effect of a state's regulation of interstate com-
155. Id.
156. Id. at 829.
157. As discussed below, this clear statement rule fits well with similar rules the
Court has formulated to protect federalism interests. See infra notes 371-95 and ac-
companying text.
158. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949).
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merce must be judged based on the consequences for the nation-
al economy as a whole. As the Court said in Hood, "our economic
unit is the Nation."'59 The Court was not so much interested
with how the state law affected the specific transaction at issue,
but rather with the effect on the national economy of allowing
such behavior in the long run. The detrimental effect of New
York's milk laws on the single milk dealer in Baldwin or Hood
might not have had a significant effect on the national economy,
but allowing state action of that type would put the nation on a
slippery slope to interstate trade barriers and other
anticompetitive measures. Consequently, states should be al-
lowed to regulate interstate commerce, even to the extent of
blocking the flow of goods or services across their border, when
doing so does not harm the welfare of the national economy.
In addition to these two principles, Tracy established a pru-
dential limitation on the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
The Court recognized that questions like competition and effi-
ciency are both factually and theoretically complex. In deciding
whether in-state and out-of-state commerce are in competition,
courts may face contested facts or economic arguments. In such
cases, institutional competence requires courts to defer to the
state legislation.
In Arctic Maid and Tracy, the Court took seriously one first
principle of the dormant Commerce Clause-that in-state and
out-of-state commerce must be in competition. As discussed in
the next section, however, the other first principle-that the dis-
crimination harm the national economy-has not fared as well
in the Court's case law. The principle is clear in Baldwin and
Hood, but it is not mentioned in the following cases. Instead, the
Court treats the two first principles as one, assuming that dis-
crimination between in-state and out-of-state competitors neces-
sarily harms the national economy.
C. Group Three-Enter Neoclassical Economics
The preceding section discussed two important points. First,
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination test
159. Id. at 537.
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rests on two interrelated principles: (1) states should not dis-
criminate between in-state and out-of-state competitors (2) in a
way that harms the national economy. Second, as Arctic Maid
and Tracy showed, the Court has analyzed the first principle
expressly, carefully reviewing whether in-state and out-of-state
actors actually compete against one another. This section asks
whether the Court has paid similarly close attention to the sec-
ond principle-that the discrimination has caused harm to the
national economy.
1. Betraying First Principles
In yet another milk case, decided about two years after Hood,
the Court seemed to betray its dormant Commerce Clause first
principles. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison' involved a city
ordinance that effectively prohibited the sale of milk processed
or bottled outside of the city.'' Citing both Baldwin and Hood,
the Court struck down the law because it interfered with inter-
state competition:
In... erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local
industry against competition from without the State, Madison
plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. This it
cannot do, even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to
protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate
local interests, are available."
Like Baldwin and Hood, Dean Milk retains a focus on state dis-
crimination between in-state and out-of-state competitors. Un-
like Baldwin and Hood, however, Dean Milk does not mention
why the Commerce Clause restricts such discrimination. Recall
160. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
161. The Court has held that a city ordinance is subject to the dormant Com-,
merce Clause even though it does not strictly discriminate between in-state and out-
of-state commerce. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,
390 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992); Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354. For example, in
Dean Milk, in-state milk processed outside of the city was treated the same as out-
of-state milk. See id. at 350-51, 354 n.4.
162. Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added).
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that Baldwin and Hood, the earlier milk cases, explained that
discrimination was targeted because of its negative consequenc-
es for the national economy.'63 Dean Milk drops this point. The
Court's silence implies that it assumed that discrimination be-
tween in-state and out-of-state competitors necessarily harms
the national economy.
Dean Milk is important because it is the first dormant Com-
merce Clause antidiscrimination case to drop the focus on harm
to the national economy. Of course, at this distance in time, it is
impossible to know why the Court did so. Perhaps the Court did
not see the need to restate a point already made in Baldwin and
Hood. Or, perhaps the ordinance's harm to the national economy
was not questioned in the case. Whatever the reason, that first
principle was lost in the analysis.
After Dean Milk, the Court continued to neglect the national
harm requirement two decades later in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey.' That case involved a New Jersey law that pro-
hibited shipment of most "solid or liquid waste" into the
state." The New Jersey law clearly treated waste generated
in-state differently than waste generated out-of-state. The issue
was whether this discrimination violated the dormant Commerce
Clause. 6 '
The Court began its analysis by accurately summarizing the
cases discussed in the preceding sections:
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected
163. See supra Part I.B.1.
164. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
165. Id. at 618 (forbidding importation of some "solid or liquid waste which orig-
inated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State"). Solid waste and
its attendant hazards are described as follows:
Municipal solid waste consists of ordinary household garbage; commercial
solid wastes from restaurants, motels, stores, schools, hospitals, and other
businesses; and nonhazardous industrial wastes. Despite its innocuous
label, municipal solid waste often contains toxic materials. For instance,
many household products-such as household cleaners, automotive prod-
ucts, paint thinners, and pesticides--contain toxic constituents that would
force their regulation as hazardous wastes were they generated by industry.
Engel, supra note 37, at 1488.
166. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618.
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an alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and protec-
tionism ... . Thus, where simple economic protectionism is
effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidi-
ty has been erected."6
For this reason, "[tihe crucial inquiry... must be directed to
determining whether [the New Jersey law] is basically a protec-
tionist measure."'68 After this strong beginning, the Court's
analysis took a fundamentally wrong turn. Instead of focusing,
as it had previously done, on the effect of the state's regulation
on the national economy, the Court focused narrowly on the
discrimination against interstate commerce. In doing so, the
Court created an equal-protection-like analysis for state laws
that discriminate against interstate commerce: A state may not
"discriminat[e] against articles of commerce coming from outside
the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differently."'69
To better understand the Court's new test, a comparison to
equal protection analysis is helpful. Arguments about equality
are about treating likes alike; the key task is to determine when
things or people are "alike" or "different."' v Likeness and dif-
ference are referential concepts-they are assessed by reference
to some standard.'' In the traditional equal protection analy-
sis, the standard is the government purpose to be achieved; dif-
ference and similarity are judged by the empirical relationship
between a particular trait and the government's purpose.'72
167. Id. at 623-24 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 624.
169. Id. at 626-27.
170. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997) (noting that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause "embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but
may treat unlike cases accordingly"); Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1215-18 (1997); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REV. 537, 539-40 (1982).
171. See Peters, supra note 170, at 1216-17; Westen, supra note 170, at 547.
172. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297; Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996)
(noting that under the most lenient level of scrutiny, the court will ask whether "the
legislative classification ... bears a rational relation to some legitimate end");
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-2, at
1440.
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New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer73 offers a good
example of equal protection analysis at work. Beazer involved a
New York City Transit Authority rule that prohibited employ-
ment of methadone users as subway train drivers.'74 The rule
was established to protect the safety of subway passengers.'75
To uphold its rule, the Transit Authority had to show that meth-
adone users were different from the average person in a way
that was relevant to the state's purpose-public safety.'76 Spe-
cifically, the Transit Authority had to show an empirical rela-
tionship between the trait of methadone use and the inability to
safely drive a subway train.'77 Because evidence showed that
methadone users, on average, posed a greater safety risk to sub-
way passengers, methadone users were relevantly different from
the general public and could be discriminated against by the
Transit Authority.'78
As the above discussion illustrates, the choice of a standard of
comparison will largely determine the outcome of the equal pro-
tection analysis. When the standard was "public safety," metha-
done users were different from the general population. If the
standard were "height," however, methadone users, on average,
would likely be the same, or substantially so, as the general pop-
ulation. Different standards of comparison may yield different
conclusions about sameness and difference. 79
The standard of comparison is crucial to the equality analysis
created by City of Philadelphia. In that case, the Court asked
whether the in-state and out-of-state commerce were different in
a way that is relevant to the subject matter of the state's
regulation.' For example, in City of Philadelphia, the Court
asked whether out-of-state garbage was different from in-state
garbage in a way that was relevant to the act of disposing of
173. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
174. See id. at 570.
175. See id. at 578.
176. See id. at 588.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Peters, supra note 170, at 1216-18; Westen, supra note 170, at 543-45,
548, 551.
180. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
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garbage.8' Quite clearly, as the Court found, out-of-state gar-
bage does not pose any differences for the process of waste dis-
posal, and New Jersey did not argue otherwise.'82
The case of Maine v. Taylor" illustrates how the City of
Philadelphia test can be met. In Taylor, Maine law prohibited
the importation of certain baitfish to protect the health and
safety of the state's waters.' To survive the City of Philadel-
phia equality test, Maine had to show that out-of-state baitfish
were different from in-state baitfish in a way that was relevant
to the state's purpose, protecting the state's waters." The
Maine law passed the test because the record showed that some
out-of-state baitfish carried parasites that did not exist in Maine
waters.8 6 If Maine was to keep the parasites from infecting its
waters, then Maine had to keep out-of-state baitfish from its
waters.'87 The in-state and out-of-state items of commerce were
relevantly different.
City of Philadelphia's fundamental mistake was choosing the
wrong standard of comparison for its equality analysis. Instead
of focusing on the state's purpose for its regulation, the Court
should have asked whether in-state and out-of-state commerce
are different in relation to the Commerce Clause's purpose of
protecting the welfare of the national economic market. In
other words, does discriminating against out-of-state commerce
harm the welfare of the national economy? If not, even if in-
state and out-of-state commerce are otherwise identical, the
state's regulation should be upheld. This test is more faithful
to the dormant Commerce Clause first principles discussed in
the preceding section. Recall that not all discrimination be-
tween in-state and out-of-state competitors is the problem; only
such discrimination that harms the national economy. The
dormant Commerce Clause prohibition of discrimination is a
181. See id. at 626-27, 629.
182. See id. at 629 ( A]s New Jersey concedes, there is no basis to distinguish
out-of-state waste- from domestic waste.").
183. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
184. See id. at 132-33.
185. See id. at 144-47.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 147.
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means to a prosperous national market, not an end in itself.
2. Due Process and Economic Assumptions
The Court's early milk cases (Baldwin and Hood) valued
competition for its beneficial consequences for the nation."
Interstate competition was seen as a means to national pros-
perity. Yet, Baldwin and Hood did not address whether inter-
state competition and prosperity were necessarily linked. In
the subsequent antidiscrimination cases of Dean Milk and City
of Philadelphia, however, the Court seemed to assume that
the two were necessarily linked and therefore discrimination
between in-state and out-of-state competitors necessarily
harmed the nation.'89 That Dean Milk did not acknowledge
the assumption may be explained by the Court's then-prevail-
ing view of economics. At the time the Court decided Dean
Milk, the Court's substantive due process cases embraced a
view of free market competition as the natural state of society.
This section examines those cases, seeking an explanation for
the economic assumption that free competition is necessarily in
the nation's best interest.
The Court's substantive due process doctrine derives from
the two due process clauses of the Constitution.9 ' Each
clause protects individuals from restrictions on their "liberty"
unless the government accords them "due process of law."19" '
On their face, each clause speaks only of process, implying
that the government may restrict personal liberty if the proper
procedures are followed.'92 Yet, for over a century, the Court
has held that the due process clauses have a substantive com-
ponent that protects certain aspects of "liberty" regardless of
what procedures the government follows.19 Under this sub-
188. See supra Part I.B.1.
189. See supra Part I.C.1.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (No State shall . . . de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.")
191. See supra note 190.
192. See ANTONIN SCALiA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 24-25 (1997).
193. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) ("Although a lit-
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stantive component, laws that infringe individual interests that
are "fundamental" to "liberty" must pass "strict scrutiny," the
most stringent level of constitutional review, under which the
government must show a compelling purpose for its law."s
To this date, the Court has recognized few fundamental liberty
interests. 95
At the time of the Baldwin decision, the Court's substantive
eral reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures by
which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 years . . . , the
Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well.") (joint
opinion of Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ.); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
331 (1986) (holding that the Due Process Clause "bar[s] certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them"). The Court
first invoked substantive due process in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857). In Dred Scott, the Court held that the Missouri Compromise denied
slave owners part of their property right in their slaves. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 3, § 9.3.1, at 549.
194. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, §
10.2.1, at 643. In its recent substantive due process cases, the Court's opinions have
been somewhat confused on the precise standard of review for laws that infringe a
fundamental liberty interest. For example, in Casey, the Court claimed to follow the
central holding of Roe v. Wade that a woman has a fundamental right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. Yet, the joint opinion an-
nouncing the Court's judgment did not apply strict scrutiny to the Pennsylvania
abortion law. See id. at 844-901. Also, in the physician-assisted suicide cases decided
during the 1996-97 term, the Court referred to, "heightened protection" for fundamen-
tal liberty interests but did not mention strict scrutiny. See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). Although the Court has not officially aban-
doned strict scrutiny for fundamental liberty interests, its recent cases suggest that
a change in standard of review may be underway. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 964-65
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
195. The Court summarized this line of cases during the 1996-97 term:
In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected
by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, to have children,
to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital priva-
cy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion. We have
also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted). The Court cited the following line
of cases: Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990) (right to refuse medical treatment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (use of contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(raise and educate children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
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due process cases protected economic freedom as a fundamen-
tal liberty interest.' This line of cases is associated most
closely with the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York.197
In Lochner, the Supreme Court held that a New York law
limiting bakers' working hours violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process protection of "liberty."198 According
to the Court, the then-existing common law rules of con-
tract-which left the employer and the bakers free to set
working hours-was a natural condition of liberty, free from
government action. 99 This free competition was necessary to
the prosperity of the nation as a whole."' Consequently, any
law that restricted competition was not intended to improve
national prosperity, but rather was intended to gain an unfair
economic benefit for a narrow interest group.20' A labor law
like that in Lochner was viewed as obtaining an unfair advan-
tage for either labor or management at the expense of free
196. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 8.2.2, at 480-85.
197. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is not the first case to apply substantive due
process to economic interests, but it is the most infamous, earning that period of ju-
dicial decisions the derisive name of the Lochner era. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897) (finding "liberty" to include more than merely the right to be free
from physical restraint). The ghost of Lochner has haunted the Court ever since,
with Justices invoking the case to accuse their opponents of unjustified judicial ac-
tivism. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82; HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BE-
SIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 4
(1993) ("[UIntil recently virtually all major discussions of Lochner . . . took for
granted that the case vividly illustrates the potential harm when activist judges turn
away from important institutional norms and become more interested in making law
than in interpreting it."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrTUTION 45 (1993)
("[The Lochner] period is often thought to symbolize an unjustified form of judicial
'activism.'"); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW 123-25 (1988); McGinley,
supra note 37, at 431 n.91.
198. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53, 64 ("The right to purchase or to sell labor is
part of the liberty protected by" the Fourteenth Amendment).
199. See GILLMAN, supra note 197, at 27; SUNSTEIN, supra note 197, at 45. Of
course, this view is seriously flawed. The so-called "free market" was made possible
by a complex web of common law rules--of tort, contract, etc.-that protected the ex-
pectations of the participants in the market. See GILLMAN, supra note 197, at 26
("Of course, this 'natural society' was produced by a complex and politically charged
system of legal rules and principles concerning property rights, contractual obliga-
tions, and tortious liabilities whose social effects were far from neutral."); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 197, at 50.
200. See GILLMAN, supra note 197, at 27-28.
201. See id. at 32-33.
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competition, and thus the national economy.2 The Court's
wholesale adoption of neoclassical economic premises-free
competition inexorably leads to prosperity-as a natural state
of "liberty" helped the Court ignore that markets might have
imperfections, such as severe inequality of bargaining power,
that require some form of correction.
Lochner's substantive due process approach tapped into a line
of thought extending back to James Madison.0 3 In Federalist
No. 10, Madison warned of the dangers of "faction."" 4 Accord-
ing to Madison, a faction was "a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are unit-
ed and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of inter-
est, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community."0 5
Madison's concern with faction was similar to the Lochner
Court's concern with economic regulation. In Federalist No. 10,
Madison explained that differences in wealth will be an impor-
tant cause of faction:
[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been
the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who
hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed
distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and
those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile inter-
est, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up
of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into differ-
ent classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.2"
In these interests lies the "spirit of faction;" the danger for soci-
ety is that government will be used as a tool to promote the in-
202. See id. at 139-40.
203. Madison was not the sole Framer to espouse this view. See id at 28-33. The
above discussion focuses on Madison because his thoughts were typical of ideas at
large at that time. See generally RAKOVE, supra note 94 (exploring the "politics of
constitution-making" the issues of constitutional theory and institutional design that
Framers faced, and the place of "original meaning" in constitutional interpretation).
204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 42 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987); see 1
RECORDS, supra note 52, at 134.
205. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 204, at 42.
206. Id. at 43; see 1 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 135.
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terests of one faction at the expense of another."7 One of the
great aims of governing is to put aside the self-interest that de-
rives from faction and pursue the "public good."" 8 Madison,
not so naive as to think that faction could be avoided, argued for
a lawmaking process that he believed would minimize the oppor-
tunity for factions to make law."9
Madison drew a line between faction and the public good. The
main question is what differentiates mere faction from the pub-
lic good. For Madison and others, the difference was tied to a
free market: Laws that restrained commercial competition were
the product of faction and thus did not serve the public good.210
This faith in the free market was based on the assumption that
unrestrained commercial activity would inure to the benefit of
society as a whole. One commentator has explained the logic as
follows:
[Miany at the time of the founding considered the exercise of
public power illegitimate precisely to the extent that it was
designed merely to advance the special interests of particular
classes or to interfere with the common law (natural and just)
obligations imposed on competing participants in the market
economy on behalf of favored classes. This sensibility was pred-
icated on the assumption that the social relations constructed
by the common law regime of contract and property were es-
sentially fair and liberty loving-or at least would be in the
United States, with its expansive frontier-and that the en-
forcement of common law obligations would not result in cer-
tain classes having to suffer under conditions of dependency or
servitude vis-a-vis competing classes that might make reason-
207. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 204.
208. Id. at 45.
209. See id. An important part of this scheme was a national government that
encompassed a large geographical area. See id; 1 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 136. A
large nation would likely consist of many different regions with many different inter-
ests. The different regions with their different interests would be factions, but each
faction would likely be small. Madison argued that a large nation with a large num-
ber of small factions would minimize the opportunity for any single faction to make
law to promote its factious interests. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 204,
at 46-47.
210. See GILLMAN, supra note 197, at 114 ("Market freedom, or 'liberty of con-
tract,' was linked inextricably with the commitment to faction-free legislation.").
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able requests for special government favors.21'
The Framers acknowledged that free competition would not
necessarily make all citizens prosperous. For those who might
lose in the marketplace, a ready solution was available: "[T]he
almost endless access to the freehold on the American frontier
ensured that those who might happen to find themselves in
pockets of dependency would always be able to escape these con-
ditions and become free and independent citizens."212 So, free
competition would make many prosperous, and those who did
not succeed could seek self-sufficiency through land ownership.
Because free competition inured to the benefit of all, government
restriction of competition was viewed as a product of faction. 1
Such restrictions could be justified only by a government pur-
pose shared by all citizens, such as public health or safety.214
The Framers's suspicion of factious self-interest grew out of
their experiences with state legislatures.1 5 For example, Madi-
son suggested that laws that promote manufacturing or grant
debtor relief could be the product of faction.21 In each case,
selfish interests-those of manufacturers and debtors re-
spectively-stood to benefit from the goverment's action. With-
out government action, the manufacturer and the debtor are left
to the outcome dictated by the market. Government intervention
on behalf of one faction or the other skews the market and un-
fairly privileges one interest over the other.
In light of Madison's Federalist No. 10, the decision in
211. Id. at 27.
212. Id. at 21.
213. See id. at 23.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 28-29; RAKOVE, supra note 94, at 40-56; WOOD, supra note 94, at
463-67; Akbil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1440-
41 (1987); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1134 (1991); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787),
in THE REPUBLIC OF LET'ERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JEFFERSON AND MAD-
ISON, 1776-1826, at 495-506 (James M. Smith ed., 1995).
216. See GILLIAN, supra note 197, at 20 ('Those who supported the Philadelphia
Constitution used [the idea of faction] in the hope of delegitimizing certain kinds of
laws passed by democratic state legislatures in the 1780s, laws such as debtor-relief
legislation and wage and price controls."); 1 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 134-36.
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Lochner is more understandable. The Lochner Court saw the
labor law that restricted bakers' hours as a product of fac-
tion.217 Bakers lacked the bargaining power to demand lower
hours, so the government intervened on their behalf."'8 The la-
bor law was the product of an illegitimate factious impulse. Al-
though the Court's logic might have been consistent with
Madison's thought, it posed one main problem: There was no
evidence that Madison--or any other Framer-believed that
judges should strike down factious laws. Rather, the clear impli-
cation of Federalist No. 10 was that the structure of government
was supposed to be the main protection against faction.21s
Lochner eventually collapsed under the weight of economic
experiences that exposed the flaws in the Court's economic as-
sumptions. The Great Depression offered strong evidence that
free competition would not necessarily inure to the benefit of the
nation as a whole.' The undeniable economic reality of the
time led the Court to reject the economic premises of Lochner in
Nebbia v. New York,22 another New York milk law case. In
Nebbia, New York law set minimum prices for all milk sold in
the state.2 The New York law clearly restrained free competi-
tion-prices were set by the government, not competition among
private firms. Yet, unlike Lochner, the Court found such govern-
ment interference justified.2" The Court accepted the state's
argument that the New York milk market suffered from imper-
217. See GILLMAN, supra note 197, at 126-29.
218. See id. at 115-16.
219. See id. at 32.
What the country ended up with in 1787, in both the structure of its
national institutions and in the ideology that supported that structure,
was a representative style of government that was avowedly hostile to an
overtly class-based politics, as illustrated by the (allegedly) unsavory be-
havior of overactive state legislatures in the decade following indepen-
dence.
Id.
220. See id. at 183-86. The Great Depression was probably the then most recent
and most dramatic evidence of the point. Generally, though, the rapid industrializa-
tion of the United States had already undermined the assumption that commercial
competition would inure to the benefit of society as a whole. See id. 63-64; TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 8-6, at 578-81; McGinley, supra note 37, at 432-33.
221. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
222. See id. at 505-07 (discussing the Milk Control Law).
223. See id. at 538-39.
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fections that "could not be expected to right themselves through
the ordinary play of the forces of supply and demand, owing to
the peculiar and uncontrollable factors affecting the indus-
try."2 Consequently, states had the power to "curb unre-
strained and harmful competition."2" Significantly, the Court
recognized that, in some cases, competition could be harmful.
The Court was no longer willing to give constitutional protection
to free competition.
The Court formally abandoned Lochner substantive due pro-
cess in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish."6 Parrish echoed Nebbia's
recognition that free competition is not a cure-all and that the
government may play a role in correcting market inefficiencies.
In upholding a state minimum wage law, the Court explained
that:
There is an additional and compelling consideration which
recent economic experience has brought into strong light. The
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal posi-
tion with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively
defenceless against the denial of a living wage is not only
detrimental to their health and well being but casts a direct
burden for their support upon the community.... We may
take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief
which arose during the recent period of depression ....
Although minimum wage laws are generally criticized as ineffi-
cient," the Court was addressing a larger point than the spe-
cific state law at issue. The Court drew on the recent experience
of the Great Depression to recognize that economic competition,
such as that protected by Lochner in the predepression era,
could produce harmful consequences for the national econo-
my." Instead of worshipping at the alter of free competition,
224. Id. at 518.
225. Id. at 537 (emphasis added). The Court explained that "unrestricted competi-
tion aggravated existing evils and the normal law of supply and demand was insuffi-
cient to correct maladjustments detrimental to the community." Id. at 530.
226. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
227. Id. at 399.
228. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 361-63.
229. See GILLm , supra note 197, at 175-93; TRIBE, supra note 3, § 8-6, at 578-
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the Court recognized that proper economic policy was a contro-
versial point that should be left to the political branches."0
Lochner was thus no longer an appropriate rule.
After Lochner, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause and
substantive due process cases contained two complementary
threads. On the one hand, the dormant Commerce Clause pro-
hibited state regulation of interstate competition that harmed
the national economy. On the other hand, the substantive due
process cases of Nebbia and Parrish recognized that free compe-
tition will not necessarily lead to national prosperity. The logical
synthesis of these two lines of cases should be that interstate
competition will not necessarily produce national prosperity,
and, by negative implication, state interference with interstate
competition might, in some cases, promote national prosperity.
As discussed above, the Court never embraced this synthe-
sis."s Instead, in cases like Dean Milk and City of Philadel-
phia, the Court proceeded on the assumption that state laws
that restrict interstate competition necessarily harm the nation-
al economy by discriminating between in-state and out-of-state
competitors. 2 In Dean Milk, the Court assumed that discrimi-
nation between in-state and out-of-state milk producers neces-
sarily harmed the national economy; in City of Philadelphia, the
Court assumed that discrimination between in-state and out-of-
state waste necessarily harmed the national economy. The
Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases still embrace the eco-
nomic assumption that its substantive due process cases rejected
over fifty years ago-that free competition necessarily increases
the welfare of the nation as a whole. Parts II and III use the
Prisoner's Dilemma to explain that the Court should now aban-
don this assumption in its dormant Commerce Clause cases.
3. Enter the Prisoner's Dilemma
Dean Milk and City of Philadelphia illustrate that the Court's
antidiscrimination dormant Commerce Clause test has embraced
81; McGinley, supra note 37, at 433.
230. See Parrish, 300 U.S. at 398-400.
231. See supra notes 160-82 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part I.C.1.
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the neoclassical assumption that free competition among self-
interested, rational economic actors will produce the optimal
result for society. 3 The neoclassical view, however, is not
uncontroversial. In law, the Court's repudiation of Lochner eco-
nomic substantive due process ended constitutional protection of
the economic theory.' In economics, game theory takes issue
with the application of neoclassical economics to problems of
strategic behavior. 5 Neoclassical economics assumes that eco-
nomic actors are oblivious to the choices of their competitors,
and instead respond to the impersonal, aggregate market forces
of supply and demand."6 Game theorists, however, rightly ar-
gue that in some situations people act strategically-they act in
response to the actions of others and assume that others will do
so too. 7 Sometimes, such strategic behavior will lead rational,
self-interested people to act inefficiently-to choose a less pre-
ferred course of conduct." s The Prisoner's Dilemma models one
such situation.
We are now in a position to see the relevance of game theory
to the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases. City of Philadel-
phia and its progeny are based on neoclassical economic assump-
tions; game theory offers a different view of the world. The ques-
tion is which view of the world best fits the position of states
with respect to solid waste-neoclassical economics or game the-
ory. In Part II, we turn to this question.
233. See Engel, supra note 23, at 297 ("[Alccrding to [neoclassical economics,]
competition among market participants leads to efficient outcomes for society as a
whole"); see also Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 342
(1988) (discussing environmental policy and taxes within the inteijurisdictional compe-
tition context).
234. See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
235. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 85; Engel, supra note 23, at 299-300.
236. See Engel, supra note 23, at 311 (stating that neoclassical economics as-
sumes that "no-single market participant can have enough market power to affect
the price of a good"; "price is determined by the total market supply and. demand
curves and taken as a given by market participants"); supra notes 32-33 and ac-
companying text.
237. See BAIRD ETr AL., supra note 25, at 1; RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 9;
SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 85; Engel, supra note 23, at 299-300.
238. See Ayres, supra note 33, at 1315-16 ("Game theoretic analysis demonstrates
rigorously that under at least certain assumptions markets can fail to promote social
welfare."); Taney, supra note 33, at 346-47.
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II. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
The Prisoner's Dilemma 9 involves a collective action prob-
lem dealing with noncooperative ° strategic behavior. As noted
at the outset of this Article, strategic behavior is the focus of
game theory and refers to situations where people are aware
that their actions affect the actions of others." For example,
two large firms act strategically if they know that each will set
their production and price levels in response to the decisions of
their competitor.2 This type of strategic behavior usually is
found among a small number of actors or where some actors in
the market have disproportionate market power."3 In these
cases, individual actors will be more likely to affect the decisions
of others. In a large market with many competitors, however,
strategic behavior is less likely to occur; price and production
levels are set in response to impersonal market forces, not the
specific choices of others.2"
A. The Prisoner's Dilemma Hypothetical
The Prisoner's Dilemma models strategic behavior in the fol-
lowing story. Two criminals are arrested; they have committed
jointly the same serious crime. After their arrest, the criminals
239. The discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma that follows draws on several
sources. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 33-34; THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 216-17 (1978); SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at
85-89; STEARNS, supra note 44, at 117-19.
240. The behavior is noncooperative to the extent that individuals make decisions
based solely on their rational self-interest; any apparent cooperation between individ-
uals is the product of a rational fear that cooperation is better to one's self-interest
than uncoordinated behavior. See KREPS, supra note 24, at 9.
241. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 1 ("Strategic behavior arises when two
or more individuals interact and each individual's decision turns on what the indi-
vidual expects the others to do."); RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 9 ("Game theory is
concerned with the actions of decision makers who are conscious that their actions
affect each other.").
242. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
243. See Ayres, supra note 33, at 1317 ("Game theorists respond that the broad
generalization of price theory is inappropriate when small numbers of players act
strategically-that is, when the assumptions of price theory are violated."); Engel, su-
pra note 23, at 314-15.
244. See Engel, supra note 23, at 299-300.
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are placed in separate cells and are not allowed to communicate
with one another. The district attorney assigned to the case has
two choices in charging the criminals: (1) she can charge the
criminals with the serious crime for which they were arrested,
which entails a ten-year sentence, or (2) she can charge them
with a lesser crime, which entails a two-year sentence. The dis-
trict attorney knows that she cannot convict either criminal of
the serious crime without a confession from the other. Without a
confession, however, the district attorney could convict both
criminals of the lesser crime. If both criminals confess, then the
district attorney will prosecute, and convict, both criminals for
the serious crime, but will ask the judge for a reduced sentence
of six years for each criminal. If one criminal confesses but the
other remains silent, then the district attorney will let the crimi-
nal who confessed go free and prosecute and convict the other
criminal for the serious crime.
The district attorney explains the information in the preced-
ing paragraph to each criminal. 5 Each criminal realizes that
her sentence will depend in part on the actions of the other
criminal; the criminals are faced with a strategic behavior prob-
lem. Under the circumstances, the criminals each face three pos-
sible scenarios. First, if both criminals remain silent, then the
district attorney will be able only to convict the criminals of the
lesser crime, and each will receive two years in prison. Second, if
one criminal confesses and the other remains silent, the criminal
who confesses will receive no jail time, and the one who remains
silent will receive ten years for the serious crime. Third, if both
criminals confess, then both will receive the reduced sentence of
six years for the serious crime. The chart in Table One summa-
rizes the choices the two criminals face.
245. For purposes of the Prisoner's Dilemma, we assume that the district attorney
is not lying to the criminals and the criminals know this.
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TABLE ONE
Prisoner's Dilemma for Criminals A and B
Scenario No. 1:
Scenario No. 2:
Scenario No. 3:
If both criminals remain silent, then each criminal will be
convicted of the lesser crime and will receive two years in prison.
If one criminal confesses and the other criminal remains silent,
then the criminal who confesses will go free and the one who
remains silent will be convicted of the more serious crime and
receive ten years in prison.
If both criminals confess, both criminals will be convicted of the
more serious crime, but the district attorney will request a lesser
punishment of six years for each criminal.
Prisoner's Dilemma
for Criminals Criminal A is Silent Criminal A Confesses
A and B
Criminal B is Silent A = 2 years A = 0 years
B = 2 years B = 10 years
Criminal B Confesses A = 10 years A = 6 years
B = 0 years B = 6 years
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Given the choices in Table One, the criminals must now de-
cide whether to confess or to remain silent. To determine how
the criminals will choose, we need to make certain assumptions
about the preferences that the rational person would have under
the circumstances."6 First, we assume that each criminal
wants to minimize her jail time. 7 Second, we assume that
each criminal is indifferent to how much time the other criminal
spends in jail."s To the extent these assumptions do not hold,
we will have weakened the ability of the Prisoner's Dilemma
model to predict how a person will behave. 9
We are now ready to predict how the criminals will act. Recall
that the criminals cannot speak with one another and thus can-
not agree to act in concert. Instead, they must act under a condi-
tion of uncertainty; they do not know how their counterpart will
act. In this situation, each criminal will try to determine wheth-
er one of the two strategies-confess or remain silent-will
make her better off regardless of what the other criminal chooses
to do. If one strategy satisfies this criterion, then it is called, in
the vernacular of game theory, the strictly dominant choice or
strategy in that situation."
246. As a branch of economics, game theory assumes that all people are ratio-
nal-that is, that all people wish to maximize their well-being.
Admittedly, because game theory is best understood as a branch of eco-
nomics, it shares with neoclassical economics several common assump-
tions. For instance, both assume that individuals are instrumentally ra-
tional and thus have ordered preferences over various desires. Additional-
ly, both assume that the satisfaction of individual preferences yield "utili-
ty" and that individuals wish to maximize their utility.
Engel, supra note 23, at 300; see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 11; KREPS, supra
note 24, at 26.
247. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 33.
248. See id.
249. See Ayres, supra note 33, at 1311-13. Of course, we can imagine situations
where these assumptions do not hold. For example, if the criminals are family
members, then they may not be indifferent about how each other is treated. Or, a
person with deep moral or religious beliefs may feel that they deserve to suffer a
punishment that fits any crime they commit. Such a person would not necessarily
try to minimize their jail time. Each of these counterexamples rely on common
human feelings that could override the assumptions in a particular case. See gener-
ally Sunstein, supra note 24 (discussing empirical research that suggests people do
not always act rationally in an economic sense). Regardless of such counterexamples,
economics starts with assumptions of rational behavior as the baseline for modeling
interactions between self-interested agents.
250. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 11-12. Dominance is not the only ap-
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For our two criminals, the dominant strategy is to confess. We
can see this by referring back to Table One and examining crim-
inal A's choices. First, let's determine A's best strategy if B de-
cides to remain silent. If B remains silent, A will receive two
years in jail if she remains silent, but no jail time if she confess-
es; confessing is the better strategy if B remains silent. Now,
let's determine A's best strategy if B confesses. If B confesses, A
will receive ten years in jail if she remains silent,25' but only
six years if she confesses; once again, confessing is the better
strategy. Regardless of what B does, A's better strategy is to
confess; confessing is the dominant strategy. B will do the same
analysis and also conclude that confessing is her dominant strat-
egy." A and B, being rational people, will realize that confess-
ing will minimize their jail time and will both confess, which
will place them in the bottom right, bold quadrant of Table One.
Although confessing may be the dominant strategy in the
Prisoner's Dilemma, it is certainly not the best joint outcome for
the criminals. If each knew how the other would act, then their
best overall choice would be to both remain silent-the top left
quadrant of Table One, where each criminal would receive only
two years." 3 This solution, however, is not possible because
the criminals have imperfect information--each does not know
proach to solving a game. Another solution concept, of great use in games where
there is no dominant strategy, is the "Nash Equilibrium." "A Nash Equilibrium is an
array of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an incentive (in
terms of improving his own payoff) to deviate from his part of the strategy array."
KREPS, supra note 24, at 28; see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 310; RASMUSEN, su-
pra note 25, at 22-23. The Prisoner's Dilemma has a Nash Equilibrium that also
happens to be the strictly dominant strategy-both criminals confess. In other
games, however, where there is no strictly dominant strategy, the tool of the Nash
Equilibrium helps to determine the players' best potential moves. See KREPS, supra
note 24, at 29 ("A given game may have many Nash equilibria."). The Nash Equi-
librium concept is used later to solve the game modeled in Part IVA.
251. This outcome is known as the "sucker's payoff" because it is the best out-
come for one of the players but the worst outcome for the other player. See Jenna
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path: A Theory
of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1471-72 (1995).
252. Both criminals will have the same dominant strategy because the Prisoner's
Dilemma is a symmetric game-both players are aware of all elements of the game
before deciding how to act. See RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 45.
253. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 34.
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what choice the other will make.' This uncertainty exists be-
cause the criminals cannot make an enforceable agreement and
thus cannot bind each other to remain silent. 5
Even if the criminals' actions were not simultaneous, the
criminals would still both confess. Assume A must act first, and
B acts second knowing what choice A has made. A would realize
that remaining silent would allow B to then confess and receive
no jail time. A would then receive ten years, the sucker's payoff.
A would thus confess and B, to avoid the sucker's payoff, would
also confess." Even if the two criminals could tell each other
how they intended to act-that is, whether they will confess or
remain silent-they have no way to ensure that the other crimi-
nal will keep her word. After all, they are criminals. Under this
uncertainty, the criminals will default to the dominant strategy:
Both will confess.
B. The Prisoner's Dilemma, Game Theory, and Decision Making
The Prisoner's Dilemma is what is called a "normal form
game" in the world of game theory. 7 A normal form game has
three elements that must be defined before the game can be
solved: (1) the players; (2) the choices or strategies that the play-
ers can make; and (3) the payoffs for each combination of strate-
gies."s The Prisoner's Dilemma has all three elements: (1) the
players are the two criminals; (2) the players have two strate-
gies, confess or remain silent; and (3) the payoff, or jail time, for
each combination of strategies is listed in the four quadrants of
Table One.
Another aspect of any game is the amount of information the
players possess. Game theory measures two types of informa-
tion: (1) the player's knowledge of the elements of the game, and
254. See id. at 9-10, 34.
255. See id. at 34.
256. See id. (noting that the criminal's jointly preferred outcome is "possible only
when the players can reach a binding agreement"); RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 18
("If promises are not binding, then although the two prisoners might agree to [re-
main silent], they would Confess anyway when the time came to choose actions.").
257. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 6-8. This type of game is also known as a
"strategic form game." KREPS, supra note 24, at 10.
258. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 8, 311; RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 10.
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(2) the player's knowledge of the other player's actions prior to
choosing a strategy. 9 With the first type of information, a
player is said to have complete information if she knows all of
the elements of the game and incomplete information if she does
not know the elements.26 The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game
with complete information because both criminals are aware of
each other, their strategies (confess or remain silent), and the
payoffs of the various strategies.26' With the second type of in-
formation, a player is said to have perfect information if she
knows the other player's chosen strategy before acting and im-
perfect information if she does not know the chosen strategy
before acting.262 In the Prisoner's Dilemma, as discussed in the
preceding section, the criminals have imperfect information
because neither can bind the other to choose one strategy or the
other, and thus neither knows how the other will act before
making her decision.26
The Prisoner's Dilemma predicts how rational people will act
in a normal form game under complete but imperfect informa-
tion.2 The game shows that imperfect information will lead
the criminals, acting in their individual self-interest, to a worse
result than if they acted jointly under perfect information.2"
With imperfect information, the criminals both confess, receiving
six years each (lower right quadrant of Table One). Conversely,
with perfect information, the criminals would both remain si-
lent, receiving only two years each (upper left quadrant of Table
One). Changing the information available in the game-for ex-
ample, by allowing the criminals to make an enforceable agree-
ment-enables the players to reach a better joint result. A nor-
mal form game like the Prisoner's Dilemma, then, allows us to
259. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 9-10.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 312.
262. See id. at 10.
263. See id. at 312; see supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
264. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 9-10, 33-34.
265. See id. at 34; RASMUSEN, supra note 25, at 18; Engel, supra note 23, at 301
("In everyday parlance, the Prisoner's Dilemma is simply an abstract formulation of
a common situation whereby what is best for each participant individually leads to
an outcome that is socially suboptimal, whereas with mutual cooperation everyone
would have been better off.").
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test the optimality of alternate rules.266 We now turn to Part
Ill and use the Prisoner's Dilemma to test the rule of City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.26
III. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, SOLID WASTE, AND THE PRISONER'S
DILEMMA
In any normal form game, we need to define the elements and
the rules of the game. The next two sections do so for a game
based on state regulation of solid waste. The final section then
solves the game, explaining that the rule in City of Philadelphia
forces states into a Prisoner's Dilemma and a suboptimal result.
A. Elements of the Game
1. The Players
In the solid waste disposal context, the relevant actors are the
states. Although private actors participate in the process, this
Article focuses on the choices the states face under the dormant
Commerce Clause in regulating solid waste disposal.6 8 Specifi-
266. Indeed, game theory has been used to model strategic behavior in several ar-
eas of the law, including corporate takeovers and contract formation. See Ayres, su-
pra note 33; Ian Ayres, Three Approaches to Modeling Corporate Games: Some Ob-
servations, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 419 (1991); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997); Robert Cooter & Josef Drexel, The Logic of Power in
the Emerging European Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers, 14
INTL REV. L. & ECON. 307 (1994); Engel, supra note 23; Jason Scott Johnston, The
Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1859 (1996); Avery Katz, The Effects of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement
of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell,
A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 3 (1985); Stephen W. Salant & Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law:
Ready for Prime Time?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1839 (1996); Martin Shubik, Game Theory,
Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 285 (1991).
267. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
268. Generally, a private actor cannot engage in the business of solid waste dis-
posal without some form of state approval. At the very least, the government must
site a landfill to serve as the ultimate destination for the waste; private actors can-
not operate a.landfill without state approval. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 134; Neil
R. Shortlidge & S. Mark White, The Use of Zoning and Other Local Controls for
Siting Solid and Hazardous Waste Facilities, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENvr. 3, 5
(1993). This is unlike other economic endeavors, which may be regulated or licensed
by the state, but are otherwise open to competition. As the gatekeepers who keep
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cally, it is important to know how the states will act given the
Supreme Court's decisions in the area. The relevant players are
thus the states.
The question remains, however, how many actors we should
include in the game. One obvious answer is fifty; after all, there
are fifty states. Also, one could build other actors into the model,
such as state regulatory agencies and even private interest
groups. But, for the purposes of this Article, the two-player
game of the Prisoner's Dilemma-with each player a single
state-is sufficient to model the problem. The Prisoner's Di-
lemma, though not as complex as actual interstate interaction,
will identify the primary incentives that work on the states and
provide an initial test of the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Philadelphia.269
2. The Strategies
The states have three basic strategies for addressing disposal
of solid waste. First, a state could site a landfill and accept solid
waste from all sources.27 ° Second, a state could refuse to site a
landfill, keeping any solid waste from being disposed within its
borders. Third, a state could site a landfill, but restrict or ban
the importation of solid waste. Because the Court in City of
Philadelphia prohibits the third strategy,27' the states will be
tight control on the activity, states are the relevant players in the solid waste game.
269. See JAMES A. BRANDER, ECONOMIC POLICY FORMATION IN A FEDERAL STATE:
A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 48 (Richard
Simeon ed., 1985) (stating that a Prisoner's Dilemma model of interstate action "does
capture, in the purest possible setting, non-cooperative incentives faced by provincial
governments. Real policy decisions certainly have an element of this rivalry, leading
to outcomes that reduce national welfare."); Engel, supra note 23, at 302 ("the
Prisoner's Dilemma model provides a simple, useful heuristic that captures the es-
sence of incentives that might be faced by state actors engaged in interstate compe-
tition for mobile capital, and thus provides a useful starting place for understanding
the more complicated real world interstate interactions."). On the use of assumptions
in modeling, see Bone, supra note 266, at 525-27.
270. For a general discussion of landfill regulation, see Shortlidge & White, supra
note 268.
271. The Court has also held unconstitutional the similar strategy of direct and
indirect limitations on the amount of out-of-state waste disposed of in-state. See
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidating an addition-
al state tax levied on out-of-state waste to decrease the amount of such waste flow-
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limited to the first two strategies-site or do not site.
Although alternative strategies other than the three listed
above exist, they are either the functional equivalent of one of
the above three strategies or are not legally permissible."2
First, a state could site a landfill, but set dumping fees prohibi-
tively high so as to effectively prevent out-of-state waste from
being dumped in the state. This choice, however, is really equiv-
alent to a refusal to site a landfill. If a state imposes a nondis-
criminatory, prohibitive burden on all solid waste disposal, then
in-state waste will be prevented from being disposed along with
out-of-state waste. The same point has been made in briefing
before the Supreme Court:
An equal fee high enough to provide any significant deterrent
to the importation of hazardous waste for landfifling in the
State would amount to an attempt by the State to avoid its
responsibility to deal with its own problems, by tending to
cause in-state waste to be exported for disposal."'
And, one commentator has suggested that just such measures
could be used to make a state a net waste exporter. 4
Second, a state could take over all solid waste disposal in the
state and avail itself of what is called the market participant ex-
ception to the dormant Commerce Clause. 75 In a line of cases
starting in the mid-1970s, the Court has held that the dormant
Commerce Clause does not apply to a state that merely partici-
pates in an existing market as if it were a private actor. 6 If a
ing into the state).
272. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 25, at 7 ("Game theory, like all economic
modelling, works by simplifying a given social situation and stepping back from the
many details that are irrelevant to the problem at hand."); RASMUSEN, supra note
25, at 14-15; Ayres, supra note 33, at 1296-97.
273. Brief for Respondent at 46, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (No. 91-471).
274. See Stanley E. Cox, Burying Misconceptions About Trash and Commerce: Why
It Is Time to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 813, 849-52
(1991).
275. See William A. Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal
Sites: A Technique for Excluding Out-of-State Wastes?, 14 ENvTL. L. 177 (1983).
276. See South Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); White v.
Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
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state could avail itself of this exception, then it could exclude
out-of-state waste without fear of a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.277 The market participant doctrine could pose a pos-
sible strategy.
In the case that originated the market participant exception, a
state enacted a program to remove scrapped cars that had been
abandoned on the state's roadways." 8 To achieve this goal, the
state paid scrap processors a bounty for each scrapped car the
processor received.27 ' The state, however, offered this bounty
only to in-state processors.280 The Supreme Court upheld the
statute against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, holding
that the state acted as a participant in the scrap business-just
as a private purchaser of scrap would-and thus the program
was not subject to the dormant Commerce Clause.281
Although the market participant exception is well established
in the Court's case law, it may not provide an option for states
faced with a solid waste problem.282 Lower courts have split on
the question whether a state can avoid the dormant Commerce
Clause by taking over all waste disposal.21 Those cases focus
on the central requirement of the exception, that a state must be
acting like a private actor in that market to be considered a
market participant.2' The cases generally hold that a state is
a market participant when it operates a state-owned landfill
site.285 In that situation, the state may discriminate between
(1976); Coenen, supra note 16, at 400-04.
277. See Randall S. Abate & Mark E. Benett, Constitutional Limitations on Anti-
Competitive State and Local Solid Waste Management Schemes: A New Frontier in
Environmental Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 186-92 (1997); Campbell, supra
note 275, at 181-96 (discussing North Carolina as an example, but warning that the
Court has signaled the vulnerability of this strategy under the Commerce Clause).
278. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 796-800.
279. See id. at 797.
280. See id. at 799.
281. See id. at 809-10.
282. The Court specifically left this issue open in City of Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978) ("We express no opinion about New Jersey's power,
consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-
owned resources . .. ."). See Campbell, supra note 275.
283. See Weinberg, supra note 37, at 61-63.
284. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (focusing on the "basic dis-
tinction ... between States as market participants and States as market regulators").
285. See Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250-51 (3d
1248
1998] ECONOMICS OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 1249
in-state and out-of-state waste in setting the policies at its own
facility. But merely operating a landfill is not enough for a state
to protect itself from out-of-state waste. The state must also ban
the disposal of out-of-state waste by private actors. In doing so,
however, the state engages in conduct-lawmaking-that pri-
vate firms do not have the power to engage in and, thus, is not
acting as a market participant."s
The market participant exception does not pose an additional
strategy. Although states can ban out-of-state waste from their
own facilities, such action does not address private waste dispos-
al within the state's borders. To prevent private disposal of out-
of-state waste, the state must regulate the conduct of private
actors in the market. Yet, regulation of private actors does not
fall within the market participant exception. States, therefore,
cannot use the market participant exception to ban or limit dis-
posal of out-of-state waste.28
Cir. 1989); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (D.R.I. 1987) (not-
ing that the government "has not.., precluded any party, in-state or foreign, from
purchasing property upon which to construct a sanitary landfill open to all waste re-
gardless of origin"); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F.
Supp. 127, 131-32 (D. Or. 1986); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F.
Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984).
286. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1995);
USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1982-83 (2d Cir. 1995); At-
lantic Coast Demolition and Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 48 F.3d
701, 717 (3d Cir. 1995) (asserting that a state's "market participation does not...
confer upon it the right to use its regulatory power to control the actions of others
in that market"); GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510-16 (11th Cir.
1993) (determining that the market participant doctrine does not apply to govern-
ment landfill owned by a private company); Washington State Bldg. & Constr.
Trades v. Spelman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982) (declaring that government is
not a market participant if it uses "civil and criminal penalties which only a state
and not a mere proprietor can enforce"); Condon v. Andino, 961 F. Supp. 323, 328
(D. Me. 1997) (holding that a local government was not a market participant be-
cause "[nlo private actor could ... impose a regulatory regimen" like the one enact-
ed by the government); Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal
Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1571-77 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
287. Regardless of whether those arguments ultimately prove successful, and
whether one agrees with their logic, states in districts or circuits refusing to apply
the market participant exception do not have that option. And states in districts or
circuits that do apply the market participant exception act with the risk that the
Supreme Court will later find the doctrine unacceptable. Many states take the risk
that their disposal of in-state waste will require them to accept waste from all
sources.
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Of course, the market participant exception poses a potential
criticism of this Article-why not focus on expanding the market
participant exception instead of overruling City of Philadelphia?
This criticism would miss two central points. First, it assumes
there is no significant difference between a public and private
solution of a problem, a proposition that cannot be supported.
Forcing states to take on solid waste disposal would raise all of
the old arguments over the relative advantages of public versus
private action, a debate that need not be settled to see that the
two are not equivalents.2
Second, the criticism ignores that the dormant Commerce
Clause-and the larger subject of federalism of which that doc-
trine is a part-is fundamentally about the power of states.289
Accepting City of Philadelphia and focusing solely on the market
participant doctrine concedes significant restrictions on state
power. For the state that wants to exclude out-of-state waste, City
of Philadelphia removes the option of regulation of private behav-
ior. As this Article argues, this significant limitation contradicts
the underlying purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. Argu-
ing for the market participant exception would be a doctrinal
band-aid that treats only the symptom; this Article seeks a cure
for the underlying tension between City of Philadelphia and the
federalism principles underlying the Commerce Clause.
A third alternative strategy, known as reciprocity laws, has
been struck down by every court of appeals to consider them.Y
288. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643 (1996); Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1745 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697 (1996).
289. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-1, at 401 (noting that the Commerce Clause is
one of the provisions that "centrally define the relationship of the states to one an-
other and delineate the treatment that one state must accord the citizens of anoth-
er"); Maltz, supra note 60, at 122 ("For most of American history, debates over the
structure of American federalism have focused in substantial measure on the inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause.").
290. See National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 660-61
(7th Cir. 1995) (striking down a Wisconsin statute that excluded waste from states
that did not have similar recycling statute to Wisconsin's); Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 790-93 (4th Cir. 1991) (striking down
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In these cases, states site a landfill, but exclude waste from
states that do not allow disposal of out-of-state waste.291 Al-
though the overwhelming judicial disapproval is enough to re-
move reciprocity laws as a strategy, they should be ignored for
another reason: Such laws are the functional equivalent-for
purposes of our Prisoner's Dilemma game-of an outright ban on
out-of-state solid waste. Under these reciprocity statutes, a state
will not have to accept out-of-state waste if other states agree to
do so. Once other states site a landfill and agree to accept out-of-
state waste, these states have addressed their solid waste prob-
lem and thus decreased the need to ship their waste out of state.
Fourth, Congress can provide an exit from the game in two
ways. First, Congress could enact legislation 292 that authorizes
states to discriminate between in-state and out-of-state solid
waste, effectively overruling City of Philadelphia.293 Congress
a statute excluding waste from states that did not allow in-state waste disposal).
The Supreme Court has struck down reciprocity laws in the context of state water
regulation. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); see also New Energy
Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (holding unconstitutional an Ohio statute that
awarded tax credits for fuel dealers who sold Ohio-produced fuel or out-of-state
fuel produced in states that provide similar credits to Ohio-produced fuel); Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a
Mississippi regulation that allows the selling of out-of-state milk and milk products
only if the other state allows Mississippi milk and milk products to -be sold on a
reciprocal basis). In Sporhase, Nebraska prohibited the export of water to any state
that did not allow Nebraska to import its water. The Court held that the Nebras-
ka reciprocity requirement violated the dormant Commerce Clause. See Sporhase,
458 U.S. at 957-58.
291. See discussion supra note 290.
292. When I refer to Congress "making law" or "enacting legislation" in this con-
text, it is used as a shorthand for the entire legislative process of bicameralism and
presentment-whereby both houses of Congress must pass a bill and present it to
the President-set forth in Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
293. Congress has debated legislation that would authorize state restrictions or
bans on the importation of out-of-state waste. See William L. Kovacs & Anthony A.
Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services-Fair
Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENVTL. L. 779, 785 n.26
(1988); Weinberg, supra note 37, at 64-67 (discussing proposed legislation). The cur-
rent Congress has several pending proposals on the issue. See Municipal Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1997, S. 899, 105th Cong. (1997); Interstate Transportation of Munic-
ipal Solid Waste Act of 1997, S. 463, 105th Cong. (1997); Local Government Inter-
state Waste Control Act, S. 448, 105th Cong. (1997); State and Local Government
Interstate Waste Control Act of 1997, S. 443, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 384, 105th
Cong. § 1 (1997) ("Each state is authorized to enact and enforce a State law that
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can do so because the Court has held that Congress has the
power to authorize state conduct that would otherwise violate
the dormant Commerce Clause.294 Second, Congress could im-
pose a solution to the solid waste problem through federal legis-
lation; under the Supremacy Clause, this federal legislation
would preempt all state law in the area.295 To this date, Con-
gress has done neither; and, although the states certainly may
lobby Congress and the president, neither strategy is one that
the states as players can unilaterally implement.2 9 Thus, for
purposes of this game, assume that Congress has not acted, and
that such action is not a strategy available to the states.
3. The Payoffs
The payoffs in a game represent the outcomes of different
combinations of strategies. Again, two basic strategies-site a
landfill or refuse to site a landfill-have been identified. In a
two-player game, three combinations of strategies exist: (1) one
state sites a landfill although the other does not; (2) both states
site a landfill; and (3) neither state sites a landfill. For each
combination, we must determine the payoff to each state. Con-
sider each combination in turn.
regulates the treatment, incineration, and disposal of municipal solid waste generat-
ed in another State."); Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of
1997, H.R. 1358, 105th Cong. (1997); State and Local Government Interstate Waste
Control Act of 1997, H.R. 1346, 105th Cong. (1997); Municipal Solid Waste Flow
Control Act of 1997, H.R. 943, 105th Cong. (1997); Interstate Transportation of Mu-
nicipal Solid Waste Act of 1997, H.R. 942, 105th Cong. (1997); Waste Export and
Import Prohibition Act, H.R. 360, 105th Cong. (1997).
294. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946).
295. See supra note 4. Of course, any federal law would have to comply with con-
stitutional restrictions on Congress's power, including federalism limits. See New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69, 177 (1992) (determining that a federal
law requiring states to either adopt the federal hazardous waste scheme or take title
to all waste within state borders was an unconstitutional attempt to commandeer
the state legislatures).
296. For example, according to a majority of the Supreme Court, federal represen-
tatives and senators represent the people of the nation as a whole, not solely the
people of their state. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820-22
(1995).
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First, assume that one state sites a landfill while the other
state does not. In this situation, solid waste will likely flow from
the state without a landfill to the state with a landfill.297 So,
the payoff of this strategy combination will be:
(1) The state with the landfill disposes of both states' solid
waste.
(2) The state without a landfill will not dispose of any solid
waste.
Second, assume that both states site a landfill. In this situa-
tion, both states will dispose of some solid waste. Each state
might handle only its own waste, or each may handle a mix of
in-state and out-of-state waste. The precise mix, if any, will be
determined by other market forces." 8
Third, assume that neither state sites a landfill. Without
sites for solid waste disposal, some solid waste will accumulate
in an unsafe manner. One commentator has described a simi-
lar situation:
Presently, solid waste disposal capacity is so scarce that
some cities are loading their waste on ships destined for the
Caribbean, Africa, and South America. The Long Island "gar-
bage barge" is the most noted incident, but Philadelphia
shipped 13,500 tons of its waste (nearly five times the
amount shipped by Long Island) to Panama, and the waste
sought a home for more than seventeen months after Panama
rejected the waste. Recent articles indicate undeveloped na-
tions are threatening to shoot dumpers who illegally dispose
of United States waste within their territorial borders. Even
within the United States, states are so lacking in disposal
capacity that cities ship their solid waste up to 850 miles just
to use available disposal capacity. Such desperate acts would
not occur if adequate disposal capacity existed.2"
297. See infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
298. For example, transportation costs may mean that it is cheaper for border
communities to ship their waste across state lines instead of transporting the waste
farther within the state. See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 43-44; McGinley, supra
note 37, at 439. Also, the relative cost of land in each state will affect the cost of
disposal. See Engel, supra note 37, at 1490-91. To the extent that disposal is
cheaper in one state than another, some interstate movement of waste will be eco-
nomically beneficial.
299. Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 293, at 783; see also Engel, supra note 37,
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Most waste, though, ultimately finds a home somewhere. But, as
states refuse to site new landfills, this waste increasingly is dis-
posed of in ways that pose great risks to public health and safety:
[E]xperience suggests that when we make it impossible to
dispose of waste materials in carefully regulated, state-of-the-
art (albeit imperfect) facilities, they are often disposed of in
far more environmentally unsound, often illegal, ways and
settings, i.e., dumped in back lots; stored in unsafe warehous-
es or worse yet, above ground; pumped surreptitiously into
lakes, rivers, streams and sewers; mixed with more conven-
tional wastes and either incinerated or placed in landfills
totally unsuited to the particular type of waste."°
If neither state sites a landfill, then the payoff will be that solid
waste either accumulates or is disposed of in an illegal or unsafe
manner.
Having identified the payoffs for each of the three strategy
combinations, we next assess the relative utility that each state
would receive from each outcome. To be able to do so, however,
we must first know the states' preferences regarding solid
waste-do they want more or less? Do they care about how
much waste other states receive? The next section turns to these
questions.
B. The States' Rational Preferences
The Prisoner's Dilemma relies on assumptions about a ratio-
nal person's preferences. For example, that game assumes that a
person would prefer less jail time to more and that a person
would be indifferent to how much jail time her cocriminal re-
ceived. Although these assumptions might not hold for all peo-
ple,3"' they are a rough mean that help to model behavior.
at 1491 ("[L]andfills will close either because they have reached capacity or because
they are unable to meet more stringent environmental standards. Only a small per-
centage of the landfills that close will be replaced.") (citations omitted).
300. Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D.
L. REV. 198, 200-01 (1990) (citations omitted).
301. See supra notes 246-49.
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Similarly, it is important to make assumptions about the states'
preferences regarding solid waste disposal. Three such assump-
tions will follow, the first two of which parallel the assumptions
of the Prisoner's Dilemma: (1) a state wants to minimize the
amount of solid waste disposed within its borders; (2) a state is
indifferent to the amount of solid waste that is disposed in an-
other state; and (3) a state prefers to neglect its waste problem
rather than address the problem and be forced to accept solid
waste from all states.
As with the Prisoner's Dilemma, assumptions regarding
states' preferences will be neither unexceptionable nor
uncontroversial. That said, three justifications are offered for the
selected assumptions. First, these assumptions have gone un-
challenged before the Supreme Court. Second, the assumptions
are supported by state experiences. Third, even if some states
have different preferences, the model still has predictive power
for interactions among the remaining states. Each justification is
addressed in turn.
1. Supreme Court Acceptance
Both litigants before the Court and dissenting justices have
made these assumptions in their arguments. The common theme
has been that states should be free to take care of their own sol-
id waste problem and should not be forced to address problems
created by their neighbors' refusal to address the solid waste
problem."°2 In each instance, the Court has not challenged the
assumptions, but rather has stated that the assumptions are
irrelevant to the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. As an ex-
ample, consider Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt. °3
Hunt involved an Alabama statute that imposed an additional
302. See Brief of Respondent St. Clair County at 42, Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (No. 91-
636) ("Other states with the solid waste problem must exercise the same responsibil-
ity that is being exercised by" states that choose to site landfills); Brief of Respon-
dent Michigan Department of Natural Resources at 90, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-
fill, Inc. (No. 91-636) ("To the extent sufficient [landfill] capacity may not exist in
other states, it is because of a lack of political will.").
303. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
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disposal fee on out-of-state waste.0 4 Applying City of Philadel-
phia, the Court held that the additional fee violated the dormant
Commerce Clause."5 Under City of Philadelphia, the discrimi-
natory fee could be upheld only if out-of-state waste posed differ-
ent disposal problems than in-state waste."0 ' Because there
was "absolutely no evidence ... that waste generated outside
Alabama is more dangerous than waste generated in Ala-
bama,""7 the Court invalidated the statute.0 8
The State of Alabama, amici curiae, and the dissenting justice
in Hunt. all argued that states would refuse to site landfills rath-
er than be forced to accept all out-of-state waste. Also, the states
would do this even if it meant that the state's own waste prob-
lem might go unaddressed. First, consider the argument of the
respondent, the State of Alabama:
Public awareness of the dangers associated with hazardous
waste has made the permitting of new hazardous waste dis-
posal facilities very difficult. A holding by this Court that any
such facility which is permitted must be allowed to import
and leave the local community burdened with such additional
hazardous waste as the operator of the facility may choose
would make the permitting of any new commercial hazardous
waste landfill a political impossibility.... [No one is so fool-
ish as to allow their local community or their State to become
the toxic waste dump for the entire nation.3"
Alabama, however, was more than willing to address its own
waste problem and a manageable portion of out-of-state
waste. 10 The state could only do so, however, if given the abili-
ty to protect itself from states without the political will or disci-
pline to address their own waste:11
304. See id. at 336.
305. See id. at 346-48.
306. See id. at 340-41.
307. Id. at 344.
308. See id. at 348.
309. Brief of Respondents at 47, Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (No. 91-471).
310. Prior to enacting the law challenged in Hunt, 90% of the waste disposed of
in Alabama was from outside the state. See Hunt, 504 U.S. at 338.
311. See Engel, supra note 37, at 1492 ( T]hose who block the siting of new
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Clarification by this Court that States may permit the devel-
opment of hazardous waste disposal facilities free of the fear
that such development will result in the local community be-
ing drowned in an uncontrolled flood of imported waste will
greatly facilitate, not impair, the development of adequate
disposal capacity to manage the nation's waste."!
The state, then, was making an argument entirely consistent
with the dormant Commerce Clause first principles discussed in
Part I-state discrimination against interstate commerce will, in
this instance, improve the working of the national market, not
hinder it. By prohibiting such discrimination, City of Philadel-
phia created a perverse incentive toward a national waste crisis.
In his dissent in Hunt, Chief Justice William Rehnquist raised
the state's argument about the perverse incentives established
by City of Philadelphia:
Under force of this Court's precedent,... it increasingly ap-
pears that the only avenue by which a State may avoid the
importation of hazardous wastes is to ban such waste disposal
altogether, regardless of the waste's source of origin. I see little
logic in creating, and nothing in the Commerce Clause that
requires us to create, such perverse regulatory incentives.3 13
Once again, the point is that states will refuse to site landfills
before they will open their borders to out-of-state waste.
[waste disposal] facilities will eventually 'free ride' off the landfill space remaining in
other states.") (citations omitted).
312. Brief of Respondents at 48, Hunt (No. 91-471) (emphasis added).
313. Hunt, 504 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
made the same point in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department
of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 373 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting),writing:
The Court today penalizes the State of Michigan for what to all appear-
ances are its good-faith efforts, in turn encouraging each State to ignore
the waste problem in the hope that another will pick up the slack. The
Court's approach fails to recognize that the latter option is one that is
quite real and quite attractive for many States-and becomes even more
so when the intermediate option of solving its own problems, but only its
own problems, is eliminated.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The Petitioner in Hunt, a private waste hauling firm, did not
dispute the states' claim that governments would refuse to site
landfills instead of being forced to accept all out-of-state waste.
Rather, the Petitioner argued that such facts were irrelevant to
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis."14 If the states were
concerned about such impending problems, then "Congress-not
th[e] Court-is the appropriate forum for such arguments."15
The Court's opinion in Hunt did no better, totally ignoring the
arguments of the state and the dissent on the issue. Through its
unflinching devotion to City of Philadelphia, the Court has
blinded itself to arguments that strike at the core of that decision.
Even if one ultimately doubts the factual arguments regarding
state incentives made by the litigants and the dissent in Hunt,
these assumptions should be the starting point for criticism of
the Court's waste cases. The Supreme Court has consistently
held not that these assumptions are incorrect, but rather that
they are irrelevant to dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The
first mission of this Article is to challenge the Supreme Court on
its own terms and, in doing so, shift the focus of the debate. This
Article argues for the relevance of the states' preferences and
their affect on the overall welfare of the national economy. Once
that focus has shifted, the debate can begin on the factual bases
for the assumptions. Also, as will be argued below, to the extent
that the factual and logical bases for the assumptions are in dis-
pute, the Court should follow Tracy and defer to the states on
the issue.
314. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 15, Hunt (No. 91-471).
315. Id. The waste company made this argument without any analysis of poten-
tial problems states might have in getting Congress to act on the issue. First, one
would want to know what interest groups have formed around the issue and the rel-
ative incentives of these groups, based on the cost and benefits of such legislation.
Second, one would want to know how many states would be interested in obtaining
a solution that allows discrimination against out-of-state waste. The more populous
states might want legislation that forces the less populous states with greater land
area to accept out-of-state waste. Whatever the actual incentives, regional differences
should come into play in creating such legislation.
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2. State Experiences
State experiences confirm the arguments of the state and ami-
ci in Hunt-individual states do not want to become the nation's
dumping ground. Consider two examples-South Dakota and
Pennsylvania For over a decade, South Dakota has been trying
to site a solid waste landfill that will receive about ninety-five
percent of its waste from outside the state. 16 Over that time,
the proposal has been challenged before state administrative
agencies, in state and federal court, and before the state legisla-
ture. 17 After a prolonged battle at each level of government,
the landfill seemed cleared for approval."' Then the public
spoke in the form of a referendum, which sought to withdraw
approval for the landfill."1 9 Of course, the referendum landed
the state back in court.32 0 In the last reported disposition of
that case, the Sixth Circuit struck down the referendum under
the dormant Commerce Clause, returning the battle to the state
political arena.32' So, after a decade, the situation is close to
where it was when the state began its attempt to site a landfill.
Ironically, Pennsylvania has experienced a backlash due in
part to the Supreme Court victory of one of its municipalities in'
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey. Pennsylvania learned that as
landfills close, the creation of new landfills becomes politically
unpalatable, in part because of the fear that the state will have
to bear the unfair burden of waste from other states. One com-
mentator has described the problem as follows:
Pennsylvania's Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and
Waste Reduction Act, the Solid Waste Management Act and
the regulations promulgated pursuant to those laws encour-
aged a reduction in the volume of municipal waste generated
within the Commonwealth. These Acts and regulations also
encouraged a reduction in the amount of landfill space and
processing capacity required for the disposal of waste gener-
316. See SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 265-67 (8th Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing the history of the state's effort to site a landfill).
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 266.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 272.
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ated within Pennsylvania. It became apparent, however, that
those measures failed to address the problems created by an
influx of waste generated outside of Pennsylvania....
[Sltatistics compiled by DER indicated that there was a sub-
stantial increase in the rate of waste imports into the Com-
monwealth. Landfills in neighboring states were quickly
reaching their capacity and were being closed, threatening
the Commonwealth's comprehensive efforts to preserve its
natural resources.... Thus, as Pennsylvania began to effec-
tively remedy the state's own waste problems, the laws and
policies of neighboring states encouraged the citizens of those
states to dispose of municipal waste in other states, including
Pennsylvania."
Again, the state makes two related points. First, the state is
willing to aggressively attack the waste problem within its bor-
ders. The state does so with a two-pronged attack-siting land-
fills and decreasing the amount of in-state waste through ag-
gressive conservation and recycling programs. In other words,
the state takes responsibility for all aspects of its waste problem.
Second, the state's carefully planned strategy is thwarted be-
cause no matter how much the state tries to reduce in-state
waste creation, City of Philadelphia allows irresponsible neigh-
boring states to flood more responsible states with their refuse.
The state has a simple goal-reduce the amount of waste dis-
posed in the state. No matter how hard a state tries to reduce
waste disposal by reducing waste creation, the goal cannot be
achieved because regardless of how much progress the state
makes in reducing waste creation, out-of-state waste will always
flow into the state. In the end, many states and municipalities
ask themselves, "Why even try?""
All of the above sources-state legislation, litigant's briefs,
and Supreme Court opinions-teach that two factors are at
work. First, the public dislikes landfills and will mobilize politi-
cal opposition against government attempts to site one."M Sec-
322. Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L.
REv. 131, 136-37 (1990) (citations omitted).
323. See Engel, supra note 37, at 1493-97.
324. Public protestors will fight the decision to site a landfill every step of the
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ond, public dislike of landfills intensifies when citizens perceive
they are being taken advantage of by neighboring states who
neglect their waste problem.32 Most states are willing to ad-
dress their waste problem by enacting a multipronged program
that includes recycling and other waste reduction measures.
These responsible states, however, resent that slothful
states-with the blessing of the Supreme Court-can ignore
their waste problem secure in the knowledge that neighboring
states must accept their refuse. This, the public believes, is
unfair. To avoid such unfair treatment, 'states would neglect
their own waste problem rather than become their neighbors'
dumping ground.
3. Nonconforming Preferences Do Not Change the Relevance of
the Model
States that do not share the preferences listed above can very
easily act based on their different preferences while still leaving
other states in a Prisoner's Dilemma. To see this, assume that a
state in fact wants to profit from the business of solid waste dis-
posal and thus decides to invite other states to dispose of waste
within its borders. Practical problems would keep some of the
other states from exporting their waste to the importing state.
For example, states face costs of transportation that might make
exporting waste prohibitively expensive.326 Indeed, some states
already are net waste importers-taking in large volumes of out-
of-state waste-and yet the solid waste problem persists.327
way, availing themselves of all legal options. These measures greatly increase the
cost of siting a landfill. See Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Lo-
cal Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 267-69 (1982); Delogu, supra note 300, at 198; Engel, supra
note 37, at 1490-91; Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 45.
325. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 324, at 268-69; Fitzgerald, supra note 37,
at 45 ("[M]any states do not wish to become dumping grounds for municipal solid
waste imported from other states. These states feel that it is unfair for their citizens
to bear the burden of managing out-of-state solid waste because other jurisdictions
have been unwilling or unable to site new disposal facilities.") (citation omitted);
Johnson, supra note 322, at 136-37.
326. See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 43-44.
327. See S. Rep. No. 104-52, at 1-2 (1995); Engel, supra note 37, at 1493-94; Fitz-
gerald, supra note 37, at 44.
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And the problem will get worse as existing landfills close and
states refuse to site new landfills. The important point is that
states with nonconforming preferences will not eliminate the
Prisoners Dilemma for all states.
C. Relative Utility of the Payoffs
We can now assess the relative utility each state would place
on each payoff. First, because a state prefers to minimize the
amount of waste disposed of within its borders, a state will most
prefer a payoff of disposing of no waste. Second, the desire to
minimize waste means that a payoff where the state disposes of
both states' waste will be a state's least preferred payoff. Third, a
payoff where the state disposes of some share of the overall
waste will fall somewhere between the first two payoffs. To sum-
marize, we now have the following rank of payoffs, listed from
most desired to least desired:
First, dispose of no waste.
Second, dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
Third, dispose of all waste.
Next, we must determine how the payoff "undisposed or unsafely
disposed waste" fits within this rank ordering. Clearly, a state
would prefer having no waste over having unsafe waste disposal.
The prior discussion shows that states are willing to handle
their fair share of the waste problem before they close off their
borders to waste; so states will prefer disposing of some waste to
unsafe waste disposal.328 The prior discussion also showed,
however, that states would rather neglect the solid waste prob-
lem than be forced to dispose of a disproportionate share of out-
of-state waste."9 So, unsafe disposal should fall between the
second and third payoffs listed above. The final, revised rank or-
dering of payoffs, from most desired to least desired, is therefore:
(1) Dispose of no waste.
(2) Dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
(3) Waste is undisposed or unsafely disposed.
(4) Dispose of all waste.
328. See supra notes 297-325 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 297-325 and accompanying text.
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These payoffs will be used to model the state's behavior under
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
D. The Players' Information
Next, we must determine whether the states have perfect or
imperfect information, and whether they have complete or in-
complete information. First, consider perfect versus imperfect
information. Recall that in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the two
criminals had imperfect information because neither knew how
the other player would act before selecting her strategy.3"' The
criminals lacked this information because they were not able to
bind one another to a specific strategy; 3 ' they were each free
to do as they pleased at the moment of decision. Similarly,
states cannot unilaterally bind one another to a strategy; the
Constitution requires congressional consent for any "agreement
or compact" between states to be binding.3 2 Because a state
must select a strategy without knowing how the other states will
act, the players have imperfect information.
Second, consider complete versus incomplete information. Re-
call that the criminals in the Prisoner's Dilemma had complete
information because they knew who the players were, what the
strategies were, and what the payoffs were. 3 The states are
in the same position. First, each state knows who the other
players are-the other states. Second, the states know their
strategies. As discussed above, states have been experimenting
with different solutions to the solid waste problem, routinely
deciding whether to site a landfill.3 ' Similarly, states know
that other states make these same decisions. 35 Third, states
330. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
332. This requirement comes from the Compact Clause, which reads: "No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see Texas v. New Mexico,
482 U.S. 124 (1987); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S.
452 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503 (1893).
333. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 302-25 and accompanying text. Indeed, states often criticize
other states' failure to site a landfill to address their own solid waste problem.
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realize the payoffs of the different strategy combinations. As
discussed earlier, states know that if they site a landfill, City of
Philadelphia means that the state will attract waste from
around the nation.136 Further, states know that if they do not
site a landfill, waste will be improperly or illegally disposed.337
In sum, the states are in an imperfect but complete informa-
tion game, just as the criminals in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Each
state does not know the other states' strategy before acting, but
does know all the elements of the game, players, strategies, and
payoffs. We are now ready to solve the states' solid waste game.
E. Solving the States' Solid Waste Game
It is time to solve the states' solid waste game. Before doing so,
recall our main objective: to test the efficiency of City of
Philadelphia's prohibition of discrimination against out-of-state
waste. By solving the states' solid waste game, we can determine
whether the rational, self-interested actions of the states will lead
to the best joint solution-the best solution for the overall nation-
al economy-or will leave the states in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Now, on to solving the game. Our two states are trying to de-
cide what to do about their solid waste. Each state must decide
whether to site a landfill; if a state chooses to site a landfill, then
the state cannot discriminate between in-state and out-of-state
sources. The states know that if both of them site a landfill, both
states will handle a balanced mix of in-state and out-of-state
waste. If neither state sites a landfill, the waste will either go
undisposed or be disposed of in an illegal or unsafe manner. If one
state sites a landfill and the other does not, then the state that
sites the landfill will dispose of both states' waste. Table Two
summarizes these scenarios.
336. See supra notes 302-25 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
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TABLE TWO
Prisoner's Dilemma for States A and B
Scenario No. 1:
Scenario No. 2:
Scenario No. 3:
If both states refuse to site a landfill, solid waste either will go
undisposed or will be disposed of in an illegal or unsafe manner.
If State A sites a landfill and State B does not site a landfill, State
B will ship its waste to State A, and City of Philadelphia will force
State A to accent State Bs waste. The converse will be true if State
B is the only state to site a landfill.
If both states site a landfill, both states will dispose of a mix of in-
state and out-of-state waste.
Prisoner's Dilemma State A Sites a State A Does Not
for States Landfill Site a Landfill
A and B
State B Sites a A = Disposes of a mix A = Ships all its waste
Landfill of waste to State B
B = Disposes of a mix B = Disposes of all
of waste waste from A and B
State B Does Not A = Disposes of all A = No disposal or
Site a Landfill waste from A and B unsafe disposal
B = Ships all its waste B = No disposal or
to State A unsafe disposal
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Next, it is important to determine whether each state has a
strictly dominant strategy-a strategy that it prefers regardless
of how the other state acts. To answer this question, recall the
state preferences as discussed above:.38
(1) Dispose of no waste.
(2) Dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
(3) Waste goes undisposed or is unsafely disposed.
(4) Dispose of all waste.
Now, consider whether State A has a dominant strategy if State B
sites a landfill (the top row of Table Two). In that situation, State
A will dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state waste if it sites
a landfill, but will ship all of its waste to State B if it does not site
a landfill. Under the states' preferences, State A would prefer to
dispose of no waste in-state, which it could do by sending its
waste to State B. State A will thus refuse to site a landfill.
Now consider whether State A has a dominant strategy if State
B does not site a landfill (the bottom row of Table Two). In that
situation, State A will dispose of both states' waste if it sites a
landfill but will allow waste to go undisposed or unsafely disposed
if it does not site a landfill. 39 Under the states' preferences,
State A would prefer no disposal or unsafe disposal to disposing of
both states' waste; State A will again refuse to site a landfill.
In sum, State A will refuse to site a landfill regardless of which
strategy State B chooses; and State B will do the same regardless
of which strategy State A chooses. Thus, under the City of Phila-
delphia regime, in which a state cannot discriminate against out-
of-state waste, the states have a strictly dominant strategy: do not
site a landfill, leaving solid waste undisposed or unsafely dis-
posed. The states, however, could achieve a mutually superior
solution if they both sited a landfill. In that case, each state would
dispose of a balanced mix of waste, a preferable payoff to undis-
posed or unsafely disposed waste. Yet, the states' inability to bind
one another to a strategy, imperfect information, forecloses this
option, leading them to act in their own self-interest, which, in
turn, leads them to the mutually inferior solution in the bottom
338. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
339. Recall that this is the sucker's payoff, in which one player receives its best
payoff and the other player receives its worst payoff. See supra note 251.
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right quadrant of Table Two. City of Philadelphia places the
states in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
IV. REEVALUATING THE COURT'S ANTIDISCRIMINATION TEST
The discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma in Part II concluded
that the criminals could both achieve a better result-shorter
sentences-if we changed the rules of the game to allow each
criminal to bind the other to a course of action. Because both
criminals would be better off, the new olution would not only
provide individual benefits, but would be a joint improve-
ment. ° Part III showed that states acting under the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Philadelphia faced a Prisoner's Dilem-
ma that forced each state to accept a less preferred outcome. The
next question is whether changing the rule from City of Philadel-
phia-by allowing states to keep out the waste of another.
state-will allow states to achieve more preferable outcomes.
A. The Post-City of Philadelphia Solid Waste Game
If we assume that City of Philadelphia has been overruled, then
we must go back and define the elements of our new game.341
We still have the same players in our game-the states. The
states' strategies, however, must be redefined. In addition to
siting a landfill or not siting a landfill, states now have a third
strategy: site a landfill, but restrict, or even ban, disposal of out-
of-state waste.u2 This third strategy must be built into the new,
post-City of Philadelphia game. So each player now has three
strategies-(1) site a landfill; (2) do not site a landfill; and (3) site
340. In the terms of economists, allowing the criminals to bind one another would
be "Pareto superior" to not allowing them to do so. A solution is Pareto superior
when it makes at least one person better off without making any person worse off.
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECoNOMICS 33-37 (2d ed. 1997);
Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1215-17 (1991).
341. The states' information remains the same-complete (both states know all
players, strategies, and payoffs) but imperfect (neither state knows how the other
state will act before acting). See supra notes 330-37 and accompanying text.
342. Recall that restrictions on the amount of out-of-state waste can be either di-
rect (e.g., weight limits on out-of-state waste) or indirect (e.g., an additional fee on
the disposal of out-of-state waste).
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a landfill, but restrict or ban disposal of out-of-state waste.
The player's payoffs-the consequences that follow from differ-
ent combinations of state strategies-will change because we
have additional strategy combinations. We will still have the
three payoffs from the City of Philadelphia game. First, if both
states refuse to site a landfill, then waste will either go undis-
posed or be unsafely disposed. Second, if both states site a land-
fill, then each state will dispose of some mix of in-state and out-
of-state waste. Third, if one state sites a landfill and the other
does not, then the state that sites a landfill will dispose of both
states' waste.
With the addition of the new strategy-site a landfill, but re-
strict disposal of out-of-state waste-we have three new strategy
combinations to which we must assign payoffs:
(1) One state sites a landfill with restrictions on out-of-state
waste, and the other state sites a landfill with no restrictions.
(2) One state sites a landfill with restrictions on out-of-state
waste, and the other state refuses to site a landfill.
(3) Both states site a landfill with restrictions on out-of-state
waste.
Given the same assumptions about the states' rational prefer-
ences-that is, they wish to dispose of less waste themselves and
they are indifferent to how much waste the other state dispos-
es 34 -- it is important to determine the payoffs for the three
new strategy combinations.
First, consider the scenario in which one state sites a landfill
with restrictions on out-of-state waste, and the other state sites
a landfill with no restrictions. In this situation, each state will
largely dispose of its own waste. Of course, as when both states
sited a landfill in the prior game, if a state does not ban out-of-
state waste, some waste will flow across state borders due to
economic forces such as transportation costs and the relative
cost of disposal.3" The payoff should be that each state will
dispose of an acceptable mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
Second, we have the scenario in which one state sites a land-
fill with restrictions on out-of-state waste, and the other state
343. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
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refuses to site a landfill. In this case, the state that sites the
landfill will be able to control precisely how much out-of-state
waste it will accept. The state that refused to site, however, will
have much of its waste either undisposed or unsafely disposed
because the other state is no longer forced to accept all out-of-
state waste.
Third, consider the scenario in which both states site a land-
fill with restrictions on out-of-state waste. In this situation, the
states will again largely dispose of their own waste, accepting
only the out-of-state waste that they choose. Each state will dis-
pose of an acceptable mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
Based on the players, strategies, and payoffs just discussed,
Table Three depicts the post-City of Philadelphia game.
1270
Scenario No. 1:
Scenario No. 2:
Scenario No. 3:
Scenario No. 4:
Scenario No. 5:
Scenario No. 6:
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TABLE THREE
The Post-City of Philadelphia Game
If both states refuse to site a landfill, then solid waste either will go
undisposed or will be disposed of in an illegal or unsafe manner.
If State A sites a landfill without restrictions on out-of-state waste
and State B does not site a landfill, then State A will dispose of both
states' waste. The converse would be true if State B is the only state
to site a landfill without restrictions.
If both states site a landfill, then both states will dispose of a mix of
in-state and out-of-state waste.
If State A sites a landfill with restrictions on disposal of out-of-state
waste and State B sites a landfill with no restrictions, then both
states will dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
If State A sites a landfill with restrictions on out-of-state waste and
State B refuses to site a landfill, then State A will dispose of a mix
of in-state and out-of-state waste and State B will have waste that
either goes undisposed or is disposed in an illegal or unsafe manner.
If both states site a landfill with restrictions on out-of-state waste,
then both states will dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state
waste.
State A Sites a
Landfill
State A Sites a
Landfill with
Restrictions on
Out-of-State
Waste
State A Does
Not Site a
Landfill
State B Sites a A = Disposes of A = Disposes of A = Ships its
Landfill a mix of waste a mix of waste waste to
B = Disposes of B = Disposes of State B
a mix of waste a mix of waste B = Disposes of
all waste from A
and B
State B Sites a A = Disposes of A = Disposes of A = No disposal
Landfill with a mix of waste a mix of waste or unsafe
Restrictions on B = Disposes of B = Disposes of disposal
Out-of-State a mix of waste a mix of waste B = Disposes of
Waste a mix of waste
State B Does A = Disposes of A = Disposes of A = No disposal
Not Site a all waste from a mix of waste or unsafe
Landfill A and B B = No disposal disposal
B = Ships its or unsafe B = No disposal
waste to disposal or unsafe
State A disposal
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Once again, it is important to ask whether the states have a
strictly dominant strategy-a strategy that will make each state
better off regardless of the strategy the other state chooses. To
answer this question, we must define the states' rational prefer-
ences; the preferences should remain the same as before:
(1) Dispose of no waste.
(2) Dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
(3) Waste goes undisposed or is unsafely disposed.
(4) Dispose of all waste.
Table Three shows that the states do not have a strictly dominant
strategy. None of the three strategies dominates the others. To see
this point, for each strategy that State A can choose, determine
whether either of the other two strategies make State A better off
regardless of what strategy State B chooses. For example, consider
State A's strategy of siting a landfill (first column in Table Three).
We must ask whether siting a landfill is State A's best choice re-
gardless of what State B does. To do this, first look at the upper
left quadrant of Table Three where States A and B both site a
landfill. In that quadrant, both states dispose of a mix of in-state
and out-of-state waste. Now, look to see if State A would be better
off selecting another strategy given State B's decision to site a
landfill. The answer is "yes"; if State B sites a landfill, then State
A would be better off not siting a landfill because that combination
of strategies results in StateA disposing of no waste. So, the strat-
egy of siting a landfill is not dominant for State A. Doing the same
analysis for State A's other two strategies, siting a landfill with
restrictions (second column in Table Three), and not siting a land-
fill (third column in Table Three) shows that neither of those two
strategies is dominant.34
Having concluded that no strategy is dominant, we must use
another method of game theory to predict how the states will act.
345. To see this, examine each strategy on Table Three. First, determine whether
the strategy to site a landfill with restrictions (second column) is dominant. The
strategy is not dominant because State A is better off not siting a landfill if State B
decides to site a landfill. Second, determine whether the strategy to not site a land-
fill (third column) is dominant. That strategy is not dominant because State A would
be better off siting a landfill, with or without restrictions, if State B sites a landfill
with restrictions, where State A will dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-state
waste.
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The solution concept most often used when no strategy is domi-
nant is what game theorists call the "Nash Equilibrium." A combi-
nation of strategies constitute a Nash Equilibrium if neither play-
er can do better by choosing another strategy."4 There is no easy
way to determine the Nash Equilibrium. Each box of Table Three
must be analyzed and one must ask whether either state could
improve its payoff by selecting another strategy given the strategy
of the other state. If one state can improve, then the square is not a
Nash Equilibrium; if neither state can improve, then the square is
a Nash Equilibrium. It is possible that a game will have more than
one Nash Equilibrium."4
To see how the Nash Equilibrium solution concept works, con-
sider the top, left square of Table Three. We must ask whether
either state can improve its payoff by choosing another strategy.
First, consider State A. In the top, left box, State A's payoff is "dis-
pose of a mix of waste." Holding State B's strategy constant (State
B sites a landfill), can State A improve its payoff by choosing an-
other strategy? Consider the two remaining strategies. State A
will not improve by siting a landfill with restrictions (top, center
square) because State A will still dispose of a mix of waste. StateA
will improve, however, by refusing to site a landfill (top, right
square) because State A will not have to dispose of any waste (the
states' most preferred payoff). Because State A can improve its
payoff by selecting another strategy, the top, left square is not a
Nash Equilibrium.
Repeating the same process for the remaining eight squares of
Table Three shows that there is only one Nash Equilibrium-the
center square where each state sites a landfill with restrictions. In
that square, neither state can improve its payoff given the strategy
of the other state. 4 The game has a single Nash Equilibrium
that game theory predicts the states will choose. The solution of
346. See supra note 250.
347. See supra note 250.
348. Consider the position of State A in that square. In the center square, State
A will dispose of a mix of waste. Given that State B will site a landfill with restric-
tions, State A cannot improve on this payoff-State A will either (1) dispose of a
mix of waste if it sites a landfill without restrictions or (2) have undisposed or un-
safely disposed waste if it refuses to site a landfill. Neither of these payoffs im-
proves on the payoff in the center square. The same result follows for State B.
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the post-City of Philadelphia solid waste game is that both states
will site a landfill with restrictions on the disposal of out-of-state
waste, leading each state to dispose of a mix of in-state and out-of-
state waste.
We are now in a position to assess whether overruling City of
Philadelphia will improve the national welfare. To do so, we must
compare the solutions to the City of Philadelphia game, discussed
in Part Ill, and the post-City of Philadelphia game, discussed in
this Part IV. The solution of the post-City of Philadelphia game is
for both states to site a landfill with restrictions on out-of-state
waste (the shaded, center box in Table Three), which will lead both
states to dispose of some mix of in-state and out-of-state waste.
The question is whether this outcome is preferable to the solution
of the City of Philadelphia game, in which both states refuse to
site a landfill (bottom right quadrant of Table Two), and both
states face undisposed or unsafely disposed waste. We turn to that
question in the next section.
B. Return to Dormant Commerce Clause First Principles
The Prisoner's Dilemma shows how City of Philadelphia vio-
lates dormant Commerce Clause first principles. Recall the first
principles discussed earlier. The antidiscrimination test of the
dormant Commerce Clause was intended to promote the welfare of
the national economy.349 Under this purpose, states offend the
Commerce Clause when they restrict interstate competition to the
detriment of the national economy. Baldwin and Hood showed
states discriminating against out-of-state competitors to the detri-
ment of the national economy, in direct conflict with dormant
Commerce Clause first principles.35
349. See supra Part I.B.1.
350. See supra Part I.B.1. Of course, free competition in the marketplace does not
mean the absence of any government regulation. Indeed, one important legacy of the
New Deal era has been the recognition that there is no marketplace free from all
government regulation. See MARK V. TUSHNET & LouIs MICHAEL SEIDMAN, REM-
NANTS OF BELIEF 66-68 (1996). Recall that this was the fatal sin of Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state
law that regulated the working hours of bakers. The same can be said for the inter-
state market involved in the dormant Commerce Clause cases. This market surely is
regulated by many state and federal laws. Under the dormant Commerce Clause,
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In the solid waste disposal context, the remaining question is
whether state discrimination against out-of-state waste, as mod-
eled in the post-City of Philadelphia game, reduces national wel-
fare compared to a legal regime that prohibits such discrimination,
as modeled in the City of Philadelphia game. To answer this ques-
tion, we must compare the solution to each game. In the post-City
of Philadelphia game-allowing discrimination-both states will
site a landfill, with a payoff that both states will dispose of a mix of
in-state and out-of-state waste. In the City of Philadelphia
game-prohibiting discrimination-neither state will site a land-
fill, with a payoff that waste will either go undisposed or be illegal-
ly or unsafely disposed. The next question is which payoff makes
the nation better off.
As discussed earlier, if both states refuse to site a landfill, three
main things could happen to the waste generated by the
states. 5' First, the waste could be unsafely disposed, as waste
accumulates in storage facilities ill-suited to the task of solid
waste disposal. Second, waste could be disposed of illegally, again
in a manner ill-suited to safe solid waste disposal. Third, the waste
could be shipped to another jurisdiction-such as a foreign country
or a distant state-for disposal. In the first two cases, the safety
hazards posed by those actions decrease the welfare of the nation-
al economy. In the third case, the states' artificial restriction on
the supply of landfill space will harm the national economy. Each
effect is discussed in turn.
Solid waste disposal poses many risks to public health and safe-
ty.52 For example, solid waste contains chemicals that can con-
taminate groundwater used for drinking, bathing, and agricul-
ture.353 Also, improperly disposed waste can result in air pol-
lution and can ruin the soil of neighboring property. For these rea-
sons, states that site landfills regulate carefully the construction
however, the interstate marketplace must be "free" from state laws that unduly
restrict competition across state lines.
351. See supra notes 299.300 and accompanying text.
352. See Engel, supra note 37, at 1487-89 ("Despite its innocuous label, municipal
solid waste often contains toxic materials.").
353. See id. at 1488 ("Groundwater contamination from toxic 'leachate,' the rain-
water that seeps through landfills, presents the primary environmental threat from
solid waste landfills.") (citation omitted).
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and maintenance of those sites. States require that solid waste
landfills be constructed and maintained so as to minimize the
threat to public health and safety.
Constructing and operating a safe landfill is not cheap. 54 The
cost of such a project is passed on to those who generate the waste
by means of waste disposal fees and other similar charges. 5
These fees are part of a beneficial economic process known as
internalizing costs. To the economist, costs are internalized when
the party engaging in an activity bears all the costs of that activi-
ty."6 If the party engaging in the activity does not bear all the
costs of the activity, but instead imposes those costs on parties
external to the activity, then the costs not borne are referred to as
externalities.5 Externalities do not disappear; they are borne by
other members of society.
As an example of internalized costs and externalities, consider a
firm that produces widgets. 58 As a by-product of the widget-
making process, the firm produces several tons of solid waste in a
given time period. Disposal of the waste as well as any harm that
the waste could cause, such as groundwater or soil contamination,
are costs of the widget-making process. If groundwater or soil is
contaminated, either someone will have to clean them up, which
costs money, or they will remain unusable, the resources will have
lost their value. The cleanup cost or lost value are both properly
allocated as costs of the widget-making process. If the firm pays
for any harm done by the waste, then the firm has internalized
that cost of the widget-making process. If, however, the firm
dumps the waste illegally or allows it to accumulate unsafely, then
the firm may avoid these costs, forcing society to bear them. In
that case, the firm has externalized that cost from the widget-mak-
ing process.359 Put another way, the cost of the firm's solid waste
354. See id. at 1490-91.
355. See it.
356. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 340, at 139.
357. See R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 24 (1988) (defining
an externality as 'the effect of one person's decision on someone who is not a party
to that decision"); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 340, at 139-40; SEIDENFELD, supra
note 25, at 63. Economists also apply the same concept to the benefits generated by
an activity.
358. This example is taken in part from SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 63-64.
359. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 340, at 39; SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 64.
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is an externality borne by society.
When a state sites a landfill and regulates solid waste disposal,
the state provides a mechanism for internalizing the costs of ac-
tivities that generate solid waste. 6 ' By providing a relatively
safe disposal alternative, regulated landfills minimize costs for
society by reducing the risk of water or soil contamination. The
cost of the landfill itself is passed along to the firm that generated
the waste through fees charged for waste disposal. Thus, by siting
a landfill, a state helps to internalize the cost of solid waste, there-
by reducing externalities. Conversely, if a state refuses to site a
landfill, then solid waste will be dumped illegally or unsafely,
externalizing that cost.
Reducing externalities will enhance the welfare of the national
economy. To understand this point, one must know why it is im-
portant for an activity to bear all of its costs. Economics is con-
cerned generally with the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
Ideally, the market allocates resources based on the prevailing
supply and demand for the good. 6' The supply that a producer
will offer will depend, in large part, on the producer's cost of pro-
ducing the good. The lower the cost, the more that the producer
will offer at any given price, and vice versa. If a cost such as solid
waste disposal is not borne by the producer, then the producer's
costs will be lower.362 With lower costs, the producer will offer
more of the good at any given price than if the cost was internal-
ized. Externalities, therefore, cause greater production of goods
than the market would otherwise dictate. 3
In sum, externalities pose two main problems. First, they cause
an inefficient allocation of scarce resources, causing
overproduction of some goods. Second, they impose costs on other
actors who must bear those costs as a deadweight loss. Both of
these negative consequences would flow from a regime in which
360. Tort liability for harm caused by waste would be another method of internal-
izing costs. That option, however, suffers from high transaction costs, costs of litiga-
tion, that could offset any gains from internalizing costs of pollution.
361. For an excellent, eminently readable explanation of this point, see
SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 23-34.
362. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 29, at 10-25.
363. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 340, at 39; SEIDENFELD, supra note 25, at 64.
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states refused to site a landfill. In that case, solid waste would be
illegally or unsafely disposed, which would externalize the cost of
solid waste. With solid waste as an externality, activities in society
would no longer reflect their true costs, which would lead to a
misallocation of resources. Society would be better off if the state
sited a landfill, providing a mechanism for internalizing the costs
of solid waste.
In addition to creating externalities, a state's refusal to site
a landfill could increase the cost of solid waste disposal in two
other ways. First, recall that not all waste will be illegally or
unsafely disposed. Rather, some waste will seek out distant
disposal sites. Forcing waste to travel long distances will force
those disposing of waste to bear additional transportation costs
for the waste.3
Second, a state's refusal to site a landfill will also harm the
national economy by artificially restricting the supply of landfill
space, thereby increasing the cost of disposing at existing land-
fills. The cost of disposing in a landfill will reflect, in part, the
supply of landfill space and the demand for that space. If the
supply of landfill space decreases while demand stays constant
or increases, then an increase in the price of waste disposal at
existing landfill sites should occur. By artificially restricting the
supply of landfill space-by refusing to site landfills-the two
states have caused the market to set a higher price for waste
disposal than would occur if entry into the landfill market was
less restricted. If, however, each state sited a landfill, then there
would be increased competition among landfills, corresponding
to the increase in the supply of landfill space, and the waste dis-
posal process would be more efficient. Once again, the states'
refusal to site a landfill has reduced the efficiency of solid waste
disposal, thereby reducing the welfare of society.
In sum, the welfare of the national economy is better served if
states site a landfill than if states refuse to site a landfill. Re-
fusing to site a landfill leads to inefficient behavior, due to
externalized costs, increased transportation costs, and an artifi-
cial reduction of landfill space. City of Philadelphia-which pro-
hibits discrimination against out-of-state waste-forces states
364. See supra note 298.
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into a Prisoner's Dilemma in which they refuse to site a landfill.
Allowing discrimination, by overruling City of Philadelphia,
however, will lead the states to site a landfill which, in turn,
will enhance the welfare of society.
Now, we can assess the assumption underlying the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination test: that discrim-
ination between in-state and out-of-state competitors necessarily
harms the national economy. As discussed earlier, the Court's
assumption is based on the neoclassical economic view that free
competition among rational, self-interested actors necessarily
enhances the welfare of society.3" Conversely, game theory
posits that the neoclassical view of economics will break
down-indeed, may decrease the welfare of society-when people
or entities act strategically. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
criminals' rational self-interest led them both to confess, even
though that strategy combination yielded a worse joint out-
come-each criminal receives a six-year sentence-than if both
criminals remained silent, in which case each criminal would
receive a two-year sentence.
Similarly, as Part III of this paper showed, City of Philadel-
phia forces states into a Prisoner's Dilemma with respect to
solid waste disposal. 66 In their Prisoner's Dilemma, both
states will refuse to site a landfill, even though that strategy
yielded a worse joint outcome. Solid waste will be either undis-
posed or unsafely disposed, but if both states had sited a land-
fill, each state would address a portion of the solid waste prob-
lem. Game theory shows that City of Philadelphia-and its neo-
classical view of economics-forces states into a Prisoner's Di-
lemma in which each state's pursuit of its rational self-interest
leads to a less preferred outcome for the nation."6 7
365. See supra notes 23, 233 and accompanying text.
366. See supra Part III.
367. As other commentators have suggested, a federal solution would be the most
preferable solution to the states' situation. See Engel, supra note 37, at 1551-60. On
the general topic of the comparative desirability of state versus federal regulation,
see PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995); DAvID L. SHAPIRO, FEDER-
ALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-
optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter?:
Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1981); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reflection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J.
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In sum, the Court's prevailing dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination test takes the neoclassical economic view,
assuming states do not act strategically. Parts II and III, how-
ever, show that states will act strategically in some cases, un-
dermining the Court's neoclassical economic assumption. Conse-
quently, interstate competition will not always maximize nation-
al welfare; discrimination against out-of-state competition may
do so in some cases. The next section incorporates these points
into a new dormant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination test.
C. A Reconstructed Dormant Commerce Clause
Antidiscrimination Analysis
The preceding parts of this Article have been critical, exposing
the flawed economic assumption that underlies the Court's dor-
mant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination cases. This section
turns to a constructive task, suggesting how the
antidiscrimination test can be reconstructed around the lessons
from game theory.
1. Return to First Principles
Reconstruction of the Court's antidiscrimination test should
begin at its foundation. With the dormant Commerce Clause, the
foundation consists of the two first principles discussed in Part
I. 368 First, as the Court has recognized continuously, the dor-
mant Commerce Clause focuses on state interference with inter-
state competition. For the antidiscrimination test, this means
state discrimination between in-state and out-of-state competi-
tors. This first principle is alive and well in the Court's case law.
Up through last term, in cases like Arctic Maid and Tracy, the
Court has asked whether in-state and out-of-state commerce are
in competition. In reconstructing the antidiscrimination test,
this aspect of the Court's practice should remain.
Second, the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with
state regulation that harms the welfare of the national economy.
LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
368. See supra Part I.B.1.
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The Court has neglected this principle since its decision at mid-
century in Dean Milk. In Dean Milk, the Court upheld a city
ordinance that discriminated between in-state and out-of-state
milk because the law interfered with interstate competition. 69
The Court never asked whether the state law harmed the na-
tional economy. The Court continued to neglect the harm princi-
ple in City of Philadelphia. In that case, the Court struck down
a discriminatory state law without asking whether the law
harmed the national economy.70 In these two cases, the Court
assumed that state interference with interstate competition nec-
essarily harmed the national economy, adopting a neoclassical
economic perspective.
Game theory exposes the flaw in the Court's neoclassical eco-
nomic perspective: In some cases, states will act strategically,
and unfettered competition will lead to a less preferred outcome
on the national level. When states act strategically, the neoclas-
sical preference for free competition is no longer valid. Instead,
one must analyze what outcomes strategic behavior will yield
under different legal rules. Parts III and IV showed that, in the
waste disposal context, the national economy is better off if
states are allowed to discriminate between in-state and out-of-
state waste; free competition does not yield the best national
result.
To reconstruct the antidiscrimination test and remain faithful
to the first principle of avoiding harm to the national economy,
the Court's flawed economic assumption must be discarded. The
Court should no longer assume that all discrimination between
in-state and out-of-state competitors harms the national econo-
my. Instead, the Court must determine specifically whether such
harm exists. After deciding that a state law discriminates be-
tween in-state and out-of-state competitors, the Court should ask
whether that discrimination makes the national economy worse
off than prohibiting discrimination.
Determining whether discrimination makes the national econ-
omy worse off will likely focus on a further question-does the
case present a strategic behavior situation? Recall that neoclas-
369. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
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sical economics is generally valid when strategic behavior is not
present. In such cases, the Court can properly apply its neoclas-
sical economic assumption that state discrimination between in-
state and out-of-state competitors necessarily makes the nation
worse off. If, however, strategic behavior is present, then the
Court should not default to its neoclassical assumption.
2. Deference to State Law: Institutional Competence and
Federalism
The question of strategic behavior will not be an easy one.
3 71
In many cases, including the solid waste disposal situation, par-
ties will likely dispute the facts as well as the proper character-
ization of the facts. Parties will undoubtedly argue about wheth-
er the states-or any other actors in the case-act strategically
in the segment of commerce subject to the state regulation. In
such cases, the Court should return to the principle of deference
articulated in Tracy.
In Tracy, recall that the Court had to determine whether in-
state and out-of-state natural gas suppliers competed with one
another.372 After reviewing the record and the arguments of
the parties, the Court determined that it lacked both sufficient
facts and expertise in economics to answer the question.7 Af-
ter all, the Court is not a fact-gathering body; that is a legisla-
tive function. Also, the Court does not exercise expert judgment
on nonlegal questions; this is more of a legislative or executive
(through administrative agencies) function. For these reasons,
based on relative institutional competence, the Court did not
resolve reasonably contested factual or economic contentions. 4
371. One author has suggested that states will necessarily act strategically be-
cause there are a few, easily identified actors who can monitor one another's behav-
ior. See Engel, supra note 23. If that is the case, then the Court should wholly
abandon neoclassical economic premises and turn instead to game theory.
372. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824 (1997); supra notes
132-57 and accompanying text.
373. See Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 828-29.
374. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. Professor Lawrence Lessig's
translation theory of constitutional interpretation urges a similar form of deference.
See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAIM L. REV. 1365, 1400-12
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). Deference is part of what Professor Lessig calls the Erie-
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Instead, the Court deferred to the states and upheld the state law. 75
Tracy deference should also apply to the question of whether
effect, typified by the classic Supreme Court case Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938). Erie addressed the issue of whether federal courts in diversity cases
should apply state common law or federal common law. About a century before, in
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the Court had held that general federal
common law should govern. As Professor Lessig explains, Swift was based on the
then-prevalent view that judges find the common law, but do not make it. See
Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra, at 1400-02. Common law rules were external
to the judge-something to be found-and were not affected by the judge's personal
preferences, biases, or beliefs. See id. at 1403. This view of law made some sense in
the context of commercial cases, such as Swift, where the common law consisted of
customary business practices that formed default rules against which parties could
contract. See id. at 1402. Swift, however, was not limited to this narrow context; it
was later applied to all diversity actions. See id. at 1403. Over time, under the
harsh criticism of the legal realists and others, Swift's assumption that judges mere-
ly find the common law was openly contested by those who believed that common
lawmaking required a substantial exercise of discretion. See id. at 1406-08. In other
words, credible arguments were voiced that common law rules were not external
from the judges, but rather were the product of judges' unguided judgment. See id.
at 1408 ("Whatever the view before, today the law is not conceived except as the
expression of a political will.").
When Swift's view of the law became openly contested, the Court was attacked
for illegitimately making law for the states. As long as common law rules were
viewed as external to federal judges, those judges were merely finding preexisting
common law principles that existed independent of who ultimately applied them,
state or federal judges. See id. at 1407-08. Once that view of law was openly con-
tested, however, federal judges could be criticized as imposing their political will on
the states under the guise of a general federal common law. See id. To avoid this
criticism, the Court in Erie returned common lawmaking power to the state courts,
holding that federal courts must apply state common law in diversity cases. See id.
at 1409-11. When a background assumption of Swift became openly contested, the
Court reallocated the decision making authority to resolve criticisms created by the
now-contested assumption. The Court effectively deferred to another decision maker,
this deference is part of the Erie-effect.
The Erie-effect bolsters this Article's critique of the Court's current dormant
Commerce Clause anti-discrimination test. Recall that the Court's antidiscrimination
test rests on the assumption that state discrimination between in-state and out-of-
state competitors necessarily reduces national welfare. On the strength of that as-
sumption, the Court strikes down laws duly enacted by state legislatures. This Arti-
cle argues that developments in economics---specifically, in game theory-show that
the Court's assumption is now contested, calling into question the Court's power to
strike down state laws under the antidiscrimination test. Under the Erie-effect, the
Court should respond to this challenge by reallocating power to avoid illegitimacy.
As suggested in the above text, the Court can do so by leaving contested questions
of fact or economic reasoning to the states. As in Erie itself, the Erie-effect counsels
deference to the states.
375. See Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 828-29.
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state discrimination between in-state and out-of-state competi-
tors harms the national economy. The same type of factual and
economic arguments will be made on this issue, raising the same
concerns of institutional competence. When the facts or theories
are contested reasonably, the Court should defer to the state.
In addition to institutional competence concerns, Tracy defer-
ence would also serve important federalism values. The Court
has held routinely that the balance of federalism should not be
disturbed unless the Court has a clear warrant for doing so.
This federalism principle has appeared recently in the Court's
interpretation of federal statutes.76 Specifically, the Court will
not interpret a federal statute to regulate state actors or an area
of traditional state law, for example, debtor-creditor relations,
unless Congress has evidenced its intent clearly. 77 This canon
of statutory interpretation recognizes that the states' representa-
tion in Congress is their main bulwark against unwarranted
expansion of federal power. 7 For the political process to en-
376. The Court's constitutional cases also evidence renewed protection for state
sovereignty. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), for the first time in
over fifty years, the Court struck down a federal statute as outside of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. Similarly, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997), the Court gave a narrow reading to Congress's power to enact legislation en-
forcing the Fourteenth Amendment. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), the Court held that Con-
gress could not coerce state legislatures or law enforcement officials to enact or im-
plement federal legislation. Additionally, in the physician-assisted suicide cases, the
Court declined to find a blanket due process right, instead encouraging states to
wrestle with the issue on their own. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2275 (1997).
377. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994) ("Absent a clear
statutory requirement to the contrary, we must assume the validity of [a] state-law
regulatory background and take due account of its effect."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (stating that the Court would not interpret the federal age dis-
crimination statute to include state judges "unless Congress has made it clear that
[state] judges are included").
378. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 ("[Tlhis Court... has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress'
Commerce Clause powers"); San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Garcia, 469 U.S.
528 (1985); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
CESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176-90
(1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 543 (1954).
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sure protection of state interests, Congress must be aware that
its legislation might affect the states. A clear statement rule
looks for evidence of congressional deliberation on the face of the
statute to prevent unthinking or incidental encroachment on
states and their laws.3 79
An example of the clear statement rule can be seen in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp.3"' BFP involved a claim that a bank-
rupt debtor had fraudulently transferred assets just before filing
for bankruptcy.8 ' Under federal bankruptcy law, a fraudulent
transfer occurs when the debtor receives "less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer."82 At issue was
the foreclosure sale of a house owned by the debtor.38 The
creditor argued that although the foreclosure sale was conducted
in accordance with state law, the sale price was less than fair
market value.3 The Court had to decide whether the phrase
"reasonably equivalent value" meant fair market value, as urged
by the creditor, or the price fetched at a lawful state foreclosure
REv. 543 (1954).
379. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464. The Court cited Professor Laurence Tribe's
constitutional law treatise on the point: "[To give the state-displacing weight of
federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for law-
making" established in the Constitution. Id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-25, at
480).
380. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
381. See id. at 533-34.
382. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) (emphasis added). Under federal bankruptcy law, a
fraudulent transfer occurs when:
[A]n interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date
of the filing of the petition [for bankruptcy], if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily -
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or be-
came, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obliga-
tion was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer
or obligation . ...
Id.
383. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 533-34.
384. See id.
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sale, as urged by the debtor.
38
The Court interpreted "reasonably equivalent value" to in-
clude the price fetched at a valid state foreclosure sale.386 The
Court explained that to do otherwise would thrust the federal
government into judging the validity of foreclosure sales, an area
traditionally governed by state law, thus possibly upsetting the
finality of state law property titles.387 Such federal action
would "radically readjust] the balance of state and national
authority." "3  Before Congress takes such action, it should
think hard about the issue, and the product of that deliberation
should appear clearly in the text of the statute. Otherwise,
courts should interpret the federal statute so as to leave state
law undisturbed.389
The Court has developed several other canons of construction
to protect the states from undue federal intrusion. First, the
Court will not interpret a federal statute to preempt state law
unless Congress expresses a clear intent to do so."' Preemp-
tion is a major intrusion on state power, bluntly substituting
federal regulation for that of the states. 9' Once again, the
Court hopes to encourage careful deliberation on the federalism
consequences of such action before Congress acts.392
Second, the Court will not interpret a federal statute to abro-
gate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court unless Congress clearly states its intent to do so."' Accord-
385. See id. at 536.
386. Id. at 545.
387. See id. at 544 (noting that if the statute were interpreted to mean fair mar-
ket value, then "[tihe title of every piece of realty purchased at foreclosure would be
under a federally created cloud").
388. Id. (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUm. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (1947)).
389. See id. at 544-45.
390. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("Consideration under
the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend
to displace state law."); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.").
391. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-25, at 479-80; McGreal, supra note 4, at 838-41.
392. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-25, at 480; McGreal, supra note 4, at 840-41.
393. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996),
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ing to the Court, states entered the Union with an immunity to
suit that attaches to any sovereign government."s Once again, a
clear statement rule protects against inadvertent or ill-considered
abrogation of a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.395
Each of the above canons of construction carefully protects the
states against the admittedly supreme power of the federal gov-
ernment. In each case, the Court requires a clear signal from
either Congress or the Constitution before taking action that will
restrict state sovereignty. The dormant Commerce Clause is a
natural candidate for such caution because it has dramatic conse-
quences for state sovereignty, removing state lawmaking power
over portions of an entire subject, interstate commerce. Also, the
doctrine is riddled with uncertainty. To begin with, the doctrine is
based on a dubious inference from constitutional text. Additional-
ly, in its application, the dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination test raises issues-such as competition and
harm to the national economy-that are ill-suited to judicial scru-
tiny. All of these reasons urge deference to state law, unless state
law clearly violates dormant Commerce Clause first principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases make assump-
tions about how states act. This Article used game theory to test
the Court's assumptions. After reviewing the history and case
law of the dormant Commerce Clause and the economic assump-
tions of both, we are left with three points to guide a new dor-
mant Commerce Clause antidiscrimination test:
(1) The Court should continue to ask whether the state law
discriminates between in-state and out-of-state actors who are in
the Court held that Congress may not use its Commerce Clause power, over either
interstate commerce or Indian commerce, to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment
immunity. After Seminole Tribe, it appears that Congress may be able to abrogate
state immunity only through its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
394. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-32.
395. See id. at 1123; Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989) (stating that
the clear statement rule is meant "[t]o temper Congress' acknowledged powers of ab-
rogation with due concern for the Eleventh Amendmenfs role as an essential compo-
nent of our constitutional structure"); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238-39.
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competition. If so:
(2) The Court should ask whether state law discrimination
makes the national economy worse off than if states did not dis-
criminate.
(3) If the answer to either question requires the resolution of
reasonably contested factual or economic contentions, the Court
must defer to the states and uphold the challenged law.
If the Court takes federalism seriously, and is truly concerned
about protecting states from undue federal interference, then it
should be open to new arguments that question old assumptions,
and should back away when what was once clear has been
shown to be uncertain. The antidiscrimination rule-of City of
Philadelphia and its progeny is one such area, and should be
discarded in favor of a rule constructed on dormant Commerce
Clause first principles and the lessons of economic reasoning.
